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INTRODUCTION 
“On September 11, 2001 . . . ” 
When a sentence or a story begins with this familiar phrase, its bounda-
ries and its ultimate conclusion are already clear.  In the same way that 
“Once upon a time” immediately embeds the reader or listener in a world of 
fantasy and possibility, this opening phrase embeds her in a narrative and 
discourse of national security and terrorism that has emerged from that hor-
rific day.  Over nine years later, this discourse has stretched to almost every 
aspect of today’s society and enveloped innumerable people, institutions, 
words, and practices.  The discourse has spanned two presidential elections 
and helped fuel a new President’s rise to the Oval Office based on a cam-
paign of change.  Within the judicial system, a spate of cases embedded in 
this discourse have forced the Supreme Court to address aspects of the Con-
stitution and issues of international law that it has had little opportunity to 
address in the past as well as to reengage with the difficult issues of past 
wartime precedents. 
This Note explores the impact that this discourse has had within the 
Judicial Branch.  Using the terminology outlined by Michel Foucault in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, this Note describes a troubling judicial perspec-
tive in the current Guantánamo habeas litigation and offers a solution.  Jac-
ques Derrida famously said, il n’y a pas de hors-texte, or “there is nothing 
outside of the text.”1  The “text” of post-9/11 jurisprudence is not only the 
written language of judicial opinions, law reviews, and speeches; it is also 
the practices of speaking: the authority to speak, the referents of speech, 
and the exclusion of speech. 
This Note argues that this text—the narrative, institutional practices, 
and rhetoric of 9/11—has formed what Foucault calls a “discursive forma-
tion,” a unified system of relationships, authority, and exclusion.2  This 
post-9/11 discursive formation has actively and inconspicuously con-
structed a constrained judicial role in the ongoing Guantánamo habeas liti-
gation.  Although numerous politicians, democratic theorists, and 
constitutional scholars have debated the proper role of judges in these ha-
beas cases, they have not examined the power of post-9/11 discourse to 
construct this role.  Speaking from within this discursive formation, without 
recognizing its power to determine the permissible scope of meaning and 
the appropriate fields of reference, courts have not engaged the complexity 
that scholars have recognized. 
Foucault’s discursive formation consists, at the most basic level, of an 
individual unit of discourse, traditionally translated as “statement” or “ut-
 
1  JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 158 (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., corrected ed. 
1998) (1967). 
2  See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 31–39 (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., 
Random House 1972) (1969). 
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terance” in The Archaeology of Knowledge.3  However, Foucault himself 
actually used a distinct term, énoncé, to ensure that readers did not conflate 
the concept with the traditional idea of a sentence or proposition,4 and some 
commentators have recognized the difficulty of translating énoncé into Eng-
lish in a way that conveys its connection to discourse.5  For the purposes of 
this Note, I will use the French énoncé in order to convey the unique con-
cept so fundamental to Foucault’s insight.  Within a discursive formation, 
certain énoncés—such as “war,” “national security,” and “unlawful enemy 
combatant” within the post-9/11 discourse—are treated as part of a single 
unity with a single origin.  In the post-9/11 discursive formation, these con-
cepts have been the unexamined foundation upon which the discourse rests.  
These énoncés have led to a widespread acceptance in the D.C. Circuit that 
it is not the “province of the judiciary to draft definitions.”6  Recognizing 
the novelty and discontinuity of these terms embedded in the current discur-
sive text, however, demonstrates the error of this proposition and the neces-
sity for the judicial excavation of discourse. 
Part I introduces the post-9/11 judicial discourse and argues that it has 
created a Foucauldian discursive formation.  Part I first discusses the fram-
ing of 9/11 as the origin of a unified discourse and then considers the Su-
preme Court’s first attempt to wrestle with the question of whom the 
President may detain in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.7  Part I concludes by describing 
Foucault’s conception of a discursive formation and arguing that the post-
9/11 discourse fits within this concept. 
Part II describes the judicial discourse concerning the detention of 
enemy combatants that has followed the Supreme Court’s decision in Bou-
mediene v. Bush.8  These habeas proceedings are especially instructive as to 
the judicial role because they represent the historical means by which the 
Judicial Branch has balanced and checked executive power.9  By contrast-
ing the approaches to defining “enemy combatant” taken by the Fourth Cir-
cuit and the D.C. district and circuit courts, Part II demonstrates the power 
of discourse to constrain the judicial role. 
 
3  See id. at 79–135. 
4  Énoncé is traditionally translated as “statement” in Foucault’s writings, to avoid any confusion 
with the English idea of a “sentence” or “proposition.”  See id. at 90–91; The Intellectual and Politics: 
Foucault and the Prison, HIST. PRESENT, Spring 1986, at 1, 21 n.1 [hereinafter Deleuze Interview] (in-
terviewing Gilles Deleuze). 
5  See, e.g., HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM 
AND HERMENEUTICS 44–48 (2d ed. 1983); ALAN SHERIDAN, MICHEL FOUCAULT: THE WILL TO TRUTH 
99–100 (1980); Deleuze Interview, supra note 4, at 21 n.1.  
6  Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2008). 
7  542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
8  553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
9  See id. at 797 (“Within the Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of judicial 
power are as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the authority of the 
Executive to imprison a person.”). 
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Part III offers further explication of Foucault’s insights into the opera-
tion of discursive formations and applies them to this habeas litigation.  It 
explores each of the three “spaces” in Foucault’s discursive theory that 
were identified by philosopher Gilles Deleuze—the collateral space, the 
correlative space, and the complementary space10—to demonstrate the ef-
fects of the post-9/11 discursive formation on judicial approaches.  Finally, 
Part III argues that the judiciary has been speaking from within this discur-
sive formation and allowing it to construct its judicial province without in-
vestigation. 
Part IV advocates that judges, in determining the extent of the Presi-
dent’s detention power, recognize Foucault’s insight and conduct an arc-
haeological excavation of the post-9/11 discourse.  This endeavor consists 
first in excavating its presupposed unities embodied in énoncés.  After 
doing so, judges must then examine the remnants and make “controlled de-
cisions”11 in order to construct basic principles.  These principles will give 
notice to the political branches about the principles that should guide their 
decisions in the aftermath of 9/11.  Perhaps more importantly, though, by 
conducting such an archaeological excavation, judges will make clear the 
“plinths,”12 or foundations, upon which their decisions rest.  In doing so, 
they will promote a dynamic dialogue and criticism about these issues that 
will sharpen and define the disagreements so that the Supreme Court will be 
able to see their full extent more clearly when making an ultimate decision.  
Although the insights of this Note may apply beyond the discourse relating 
to the detention of enemy combatants, this Note focuses solely on this dis-
course, exhibited principally in various habeas proceedings. 
Whatever outcome these principles then dictate is a question for the in-
dividual judge.  Without this archaeology, however, the text—the discur-
sive formation—is constructing a judicial province that proscribes the 
drafting of definitions.  This proscription, as Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson 
pointed out in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli,13 prevents the Judicial Branch from 
giving notice to the political branches and restricts judicial dialogue about 
 
10  GILLES DELEUZE, FOUCAULT 4–9 (Seán Hand ed. & trans., 1988) (1986). 
11  FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 29. 
12  Deleuze uses this metaphor to describe the foundation of meaning in Foucauldian theory.  
DELEUZE, supra note 10, at 16.  “Plinth” refers to the square stone that supports a column or statue.  
NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1344 (3d ed. 2010).  More importantly, the plinth is traditionally 
the fundamental support for the column or statue.  See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed. 2011), 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/145854?redirectedFrom=plinth# (quoting a 1611 dictionary of French 
and English as defining “plinthe” as “a flat, and square peece of Masonrie, &c., placed sometimes ab-
oue, sometimes below, the footstall (but euer the first of the Basis) of a piller.” (emphasis added)).  
Thus, in seeking to unearth the plinths of discourse as this Note advocates, a judge will be seeking to 
unearth the ultimate foundational ideas that support the énoncés on which many judges up to this point 
have relied. 
13  See 534 F.3d 213, 295–303 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part), vacated as moot sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.). 
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fundamental principles.  Part IV concludes by contrasting the two opinions 
in Boumediene by Justices Kennedy and Scalia.  While Justice Scalia relied 
on presupposed unities and refused to excavate the énoncés on which his 
reasoning relied, Justice Kennedy implicitly understood Foucault’s insight 
into the necessity for excavation and archaeology.  Justice Kennedy’s arc-
haeological excavation of sovereignty and the extraterritorial reach of the 
writ of habeas corpus in Boumediene represents the same approach to the 
judicial role that Judge Wilkinson displayed in al-Marri when determining 
the definition of “enemy combatants” and the scope of the President’s au-
thority to detain.14  Although the D.C. district court expressly rejected Judge 
Wilkinson’s judicial approach and the D.C. Circuit implicitly declined to 
adopt it, this Note argues that these judges only did so because they failed 
to realize the constructive power of discourse.  Foucault’s insights make 
apparent the power of this post-9/11 discourse and demonstrate the need for 
the archaeological excavation this Note advocates. 
I. THE POST-9/11 DISCURSIVE FORMATION 
The simple words “September 11th” stand for the proposition, at least 
in the collective American psyche, that the world has changed.15  Philoso-
phers have called 9/11 an unnamable event, known only by the date because 
its terror and trauma exist beyond the ability of language to provide a 
name.16  September 11th is the event that everyone identifies as a new be-
ginning, the ultimate reference for almost everything that has followed in 
American foreign policy and the origin of the “Global War on Terror” 
(GWOT).17  Although history is constantly subject to reexamination and re-
vision, public memory has rigidified 9/11 into an iconic form: “an instant 
memory”18 that is the fundamental reference point for anything relating to 
national security or foreign policy.  A post-9/11 discourse exists because 
September 11th is an unmoving foundation, a fixed origin that relates to all 
aspects of the discursive formation that has resulted.   
This Part first explores the discourse about war and detention follow-
ing 9/11.  Next, it illustrates the Supreme Court’s reliance in Hamdi on his-
torical conceptions of national security as well as its emphasis on 
 
14  See id. 
15  See Daniel R. Williams, After the Gold Rush—Part I: Hamdi, 9/11, and the Dark Side of the En-
lightenment, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 341, 398 (2007). 
16  GIOVANNA BORRADORI, PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF TERROR: DIALOGUES WITH JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS AND JACQUES DERRIDA 147 (2003). 
17  See Williams, supra note 15, at 401–02 (“So thick is the swirl of rhetoric about 9/11 as instantiat-
ing something new, something sui generis, something that is decidedly not part of some larger narrative, 
seeing 9/11 from within the United States as a fruition of some trajectory within the currents of our own 
culture can only seem insane, if not traitorous.”). 
18  John Ellis van Courtland Moon, The Death of Distinctions: From 9/11 to Abu Ghraib, POL. & 
LIFE SCI., Sept. 2004, at 2, 10. 
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“necessity” in its post-9/11 discourse.  Finally, utilizing Foucault’s insights 
into discourse, this Part argues that 9/11 functions as the origin of a “discur-
sive formation,” an entity composed of the interrelated text, authorities, and 
practices within a discourse.19 
A. The Beginnings of the Debate over Presidential Power 
Immediately after the attacks, President Bush and Congress worked to-
gether to craft legislative authorization for the use of force against the per-
petrators of 9/11.  These negotiations resulted in the Authorization for the 
Use of Military Force (AUMF), which empowered the President to use 
all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or per-
sons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist at-
tacks . . . , or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations or persons.20 
Initially, the President wanted the authority to “deter and pre-empt any fu-
ture acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States,” but Congress 
insisted that the legislation only authorize force against those connected to 
the 9/11 attacks.21 
Based on this authorization to use “all necessary and appropriate force” 
and the President’s inherent powers as Commander in Chief,22 the Adminis-
tration concluded that it was “necessary” as part of this war on terror “for 
individuals subject to this order” to be tried by military tribunals.23  The 
Administration turned to the World War II case Ex parte Quirin24 to create a 
label for individuals subject to detention: “unlawful enemy combatants.”  In 
Quirin, the Supreme Court determined that a group of German saboteurs, 
 
19  See FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 31–39. 
20  Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)).  On September 14, 2001, both houses of Congress approved 
the AUMF, and on September 18, 2001, President Bush signed it into law.  Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2050 n.4 
(2005). 
21  See David Abramowitz, The President, the Congress, and Use of Force: Legal and Political Con-
siderations in Authorizing Use of Force Against International Terrorism, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 71, 73 
(2002) (quoting Draft Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force). 
22  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
23  Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 57,833, 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).  This document defined an “individual subject to this order” as 
any individual for whom there was “reason to believe” that he (1) was a present or past member of al 
Qaeda, (2) had “engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international terrorism, or 
acts in preparation therefor” that “caused, threaten[ed] to cause, or ha[d] as their aim to cause, injury to 
or adverse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy,” or (3) 
“knowingly harbored” such an individual, provided that detention was “in the interest of the United 
States.”  Id. at 57,834. 
24  317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942). 
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including one who claimed American citizenship, who had surreptitiously 
entered the United States to detonate explosives, were “unlawful enemy 
belligerents” according to the laws of war.25  The Court drew a distinction 
between those members of an enemy nation’s armed forces who follow the 
laws of war and those who do not, offering numerous examples of espio-
nage and sabotage to make the distinction clear.26  In the Quirin opinion, the 
“lawful” aspect of “unlawful” referred to the laws of war governing dis-
putes between two nations, and the terms “combatant” or “belligerent” re-
ferred to individuals under the direction of the German army.  Using the 
constructed label “unlawful enemy combatant” after 9/11 to refer to terror-
ism suspects, then, provided the advantage of a foundation in earlier U.S. 
case law,27 an association with the discourse of war, and a broadly applica-
ble term without much definition beyond the unique facts of Quirin. 
A 2002 letter written by President Bush’s General Counsel to the De-
partment of Defense offered one of the first definitions of the post-9/11 un-
lawful enemy combatant: “an individual who, under the laws and customs 
of war, may be detained for the duration of an armed conflict.”28  The defi-
nition did not define exactly who could be considered an unlawful enemy 
combatant but only provided that the military had authority to detain indi-
viduals who were subject to detention based on the laws and customs of 
war.  According to the letter, the authority for this power derived from two 
distinct places: (1) the power of a nation in war to detain combatants for the 
duration of hostilities and (2) the language in Quirin establishing that 
“[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy 
government, and . . . enter this country bent on hostile acts are enemy belli-
gerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.”29  
Under this framework, once a military officer or administration official de-
 
25  Id. at 20–31. 
26  The Court reasoned: “By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction be-
tween the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between those who 
are lawful and unlawful combatants.”  Id. at 30–31 (footnote omitted).  Speaking of unlawful enemy 
combatants, the Court offered “[t]he spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a 
belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or an 
enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war 
by destruction of life or property” as “familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not to 
be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and 
punishment by military tribunals.”  Id. at 31.  The Court also considered examples of spies before the 
adoption of the Constitution and during the Mexican and Civil Wars.  Id. at 31 n.9, 32 n.10. 
27  See Allison M. Danner, Defining Unlawful Enemy Combatants: A Centripetal Story, 43 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2007). 
28  LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO 
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 221 (2005) (quoting Letter from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of 
Def., to Senator Carl Levin 1–2 (Nov. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Haynes Letter]). 
29  Id. at 222 (quoting Haynes Letter, supra note 28, at 1–2 (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37–38)); ac-
cord Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 47 (D.D.C. 2009) (acknowledging Haynes’s letter and the 
Quirin language). 
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termined that an individual should be designated an enemy combatant, this 
determination would be sufficient to ensure the label’s validity.30  The judi-
ciary, then, would have no place in the determination. 
The Supreme Court rejected this contention in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and 
insisted that due process dictates that an enemy combatant, at least a U.S. 
citizen, must receive “notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a 
fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neu-
tral decisionmaker.”31  The Hamdi Court, in a plurality opinion by Justice 
O’Connor, specifically noted that it was only answering the “narrow ques-
tion” of whether the President had the authority under the AUMF to detain 
an individual who was part of the Taliban forces and had fought against the 
United States forces on a battlefield.32  Justice O’Connor later reemphasized 
the narrowness of the plurality’s holding, finding that “[b]ecause detention 
to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident 
of waging war, . . . Congress [through the AUMF] has clearly and unmis-
takably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered 
here.”33  However, the Court did note that “[i]f the practical circumstances 
of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed 
the development of the law of war, th[e] understanding [that the AUMF al-
lows indefinite detention] may unravel.”34  Despite this clear statement that 
the analogies to past wars and the historical law of war may “unravel” at 
some point, most judges after Hamdi have declined to examine the “practic-
al circumstances” of the GWOT.  Judge Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit 
engaged in such an endeavor after the Boumediene decision,35 but the judges 
of the D.C. federal courts declined to follow his example.36 
The Hamdi Court expressly declined to outline the contours of the un-
lawful enemy combatant category,37 relying on the lower courts to attempt 
the task first and provide some common law adjudication of the issue.  The 
Court also did not elaborate on whether different purposes for detention, 
other than “to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield,” would also be 
 
30  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537 (2004) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that under the 
Bush Administration’s classification procedures, the “Executive’s factual assertions go wholly unchal-
lenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate 
otherwise”). 
31  Id. at 533. 
32  See id. at 516. 
33  Id. at 519 (emphasis added). 
34  Id. at 521. 
35  See al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 293–97 (4th Cir. 2008) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part), vacated as moot sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) 
(mem.). 
36  See infra Part III. 
37  See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516; see also Danner, supra note 27, at 4 (noting that the Hamdi plurality 
opinion declined to provide a widely applicable definition of the term). 
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“fundamental incident[s] of waging war.”38  In the current habeas litigation, 
however, the lower courts have failed to address the principles that should 
determine who is an enemy combatant, instead claiming that it is not the 
province of the judiciary to draft such a definition, and they have never ad-
dressed whether other types of detention are also “fundamental” to war.  In-
stead they have relied on unquestioned analogies and unexplored 
assumptions that the post-9/11 habeas cases exist within the traditional con-
fines of war. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Post-9/11 Discourse: “Necessity,” “National 
Security,” and “War” in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
The Supreme Court has only addressed the merits of the detention of 
unlawful enemy combatants one time: in Hamdi.  The various opinions of 
the Hamdi Court relied on foundational ideas like “national security,” “for-
eign relations,” and “war” while also emphasizing the radical break of 9/11 
and the “necessity” it has created.  The foundational terms, or, as I will ar-
gue, self-legitimizing énoncés, constitute the basic atoms of Hamdi’s rea-
soning and the surrounding discourse.  The long history of these terms 
within the larger discourse concerning the judicial role allows them to dic-
tate institutional power and determine the meaning of the discursive text.  
At the same time, there is a clear recognition that 9/11 has ushered in a new 
era disconnected from past realities. 
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Hamdi began with the phrase 
“At this difficult time in our Nation’s history”39 and then opened its recital 
of the facts with the familiar “On September 11, 2001 . . . ”40  As Professor 
Daniel Williams notes, opening the opinion by invoking the idea of a “diffi-
cult time” “establishes the mood of, the backdrop to, the opinion’s analysis” 
and “foreshadows that some departure from a legal norm is to take place 
and will need to be justified through law.”41  As Williams persuasively ar-
gues, the underlying meaning of this opening and the backdrop of the Ham-
di opinion as a whole is one of necessity and national security.42  One can 
also view this as evidence that the Court perceived 9/11 as an origin that 
marks a departure into a new discourse.   
Continuing, Justice O’Connor acknowledged that the Court “recog-
nize[s] that the national security underpinnings of the ‘war on terror,’ al-
though crucially important, are broad and malleable.”43  The plurality 
opinion restricted itself on the detention issue to deciding the “narrow ques-
 
38  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519. 
39  Id. at 509. 
40  Id. at 510. 
41  Williams, supra note 15, at 379 (emphasis omitted). 
42  See id. at 379–80. 
43  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520 (emphasis added); see also Williams, supra note 15, at 416 (offering an 
analysis of this statement in the Hamdi plurality opinion). 
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tion” of whether the President had the authority to detain “an individual 
who . . . was part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coa-
lition partners in Afghanistan and who engaged in an armed conflict against 
the United States there,”44 clearly limiting the decision to the traditional idea 
that an individual participating in hostilities, even a civilian, becomes a 
combatant by virtue of this participation.45 
When addressing the level of process due to enemy combatants, Justice 
O’Connor recognized the “weighty and sensitive governmental interests”46 
in keeping combatants from returning to battle and claimed that “[w]ithout 
doubt, our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmak-
ing” should be left to the “politically accountable” branches.47  Although 
Justice O’Connor ruled against the Government on Hamdi’s due process 
claim, creating a new framework for challenging detention,48 she made sure 
to emphasize the traditional deference due to the Executive throughout her 
opinion and upheld the power of the Executive to detain unlawful enemy 
combatants under the AUMF. 
In support of this deference, Justice O’Connor cited Department of the 
Navy v. Egan,49 which “not[ed] the reluctance of the courts ‘to intrude upon 
the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.’”50  
 
44  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
45  Under the traditional law of war, when civilians directly participate in hostilities, they become 
combatants subject to the same treatment as members of an enemy armed force.  See NILS MELZER, 
INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION 
IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 20–26 (2009).  Other authorities discuss 
further what “active part in the hostilities” has meant historically and internationally in this context.  See 
HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture v. Israel [2006](2) IsrLR 459, 497–99 (stating that a civilian 
who “supports the hostilities against the armed forces in a general matter,” who “sells food or medicines 
to unlawful combatants,” or who “helps the unlawful combatants with a general strategic analysis and 
grants them general logistic support, including financial support” does not directly participate in hostili-
ties (emphasis added)); U.S. Dep’t of State, Letter of Submittal (July 13, 2000), in PROTOCOLS TO THE 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, S. TREATY DOC. No. 106-37, at V, VII (2000) (“The Unit-
ed States understands the phrase ‘direct part in hostilities’ to mean immediate and actual action on the 
battlefield likely to cause harm to the enemy because there is a direct [causal] relationship between the 
activity engaged in and the harm done to the enemy.”); Inter-Am. Comm’n on Human Rights, Third Re-
port on Human Rights in Colombia, ch. IV.C.2.d, ¶¶ 53 & 56 (1999), 
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/colom99en/chapter.4a.htm (“[C]ivilians whose activities merely support 
the adverse party’s war or military effort or otherwise only indirectly participate in hostilities cannot on 
these grounds alone be considered combatants.  This is because indirect participation, such as selling 
goods to one or more of the armed parties, expressing sympathy for the cause of one of the parties or, 
even more clearly, failing to act to prevent an incursion by one of the armed parties, does not involve 
acts of violence which pose an immediate threat of actual harm to the adverse party.”). 
46  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. at 528–35 (applying the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to 
Guantánamo habeas cases). 
49  484 U.S. 518 (1988). 
50  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531 (quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 530). 
105:869  (2011) Post-Boumediene Habeas Litigation 
 879 
She also cited Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer51 for the proposition 
that military commanders have “broad powers” when “engaged in day-to-
day fighting in a theater of war.”52  These two historical references at-
tempted immediately to establish the role of the judiciary in the case by 
simple analogy.  However, Justice O’Connor did not investigate why courts 
were reluctant to “intrude upon the authority of the Executive” in Egan and 
never examined what about the Korean War context of Youngstown neces-
sitated broad executive power.  In many ways, then, her opinion is a para-
dox.  If 9/11 has put our country into a “difficult time” and mandated new 
approaches, then reliance on historical examples with little relation to the 
issue at hand would seem disingenuous.  Instead, a more searching excava-
tion of the relationships among these historical examples and of the impor-
tance of foundational ideas such as “national security” is necessary. 
The other opinions in Hamdi also focused on “national security” and 
“war.”  In his dissent, Justice Scalia framed the “difficult time” arising out 
of 9/11 in his opening paragraph: “This case brings into conflict the com-
peting demands of national security and our citizens’ constitutional right to 
personal liberty.”53  Similarly, Justice Thomas, in his dissent, criticized the 
plurality for “failing adequately to consider basic principles of the constitu-
tional structure as it relates to national security and foreign affairs.”54  Jus-
tice Thomas plainly stated that the plurality erred in conducting a balancing 
test related to the government’s “war powers” and that it “utterly fail[ed]” 
to take into account the government’s “compelling interests” and the 
Court’s own “inability” to weigh competing concerns during wartime.55 
Thus, although the various Justices in Hamdi disagreed vehemently on 
the proper approach to dealing with the post-9/11 unlawful enemy comba-
tants and the proper separation of powers, all of them made use of preexist-
ing, self-legitimizing unities—including war, national security, 
governmental interests—as what Foucault would call the “tranquil locus”56 
of their opinions.  No Justice questioned whether “national security” had 
the same intrinsic meaning in this context as it had in past historical con-
texts.  The Justices did not question exactly what relationships, what power 
dynamics, or what exclusions énoncés like “national security” or “foreign 
affairs” entailed but instead relied on an unmoving, general understanding 
of the terms.  Moreover, the Hamdi plurality took the same approach with 
the concept, or énoncé, of “war.”  Despite the fact that the GWOT is not a 
 
51  343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
52  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531 (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587). 
53  Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
54  Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
55  Id. 
56  FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 26. 
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typical war,57 the Court utilized the analogy to traditional war without prob-
ing its definition and inherent relations within this specific discourse.  Jus-
tice O’Connor cited Youngstown, arguably the most famous constitutional 
case on the President’s war power, but as this Note argues in Part II, “war” 
as used in the Korean War context of Youngstown and “war” after 9/11 may 
not have the same inherent meaning because they are situated in different 
discourses.  The two “wars” are unified only as the same word, or “syn-
tagm.”58  Using Foucault’s insight into discourse, this Note argues that the 
meaning of “war,” like other énoncés, is constructed by the various aspects 
of the discourse in which it is situated, including the power relationships 
that control who defines the word and the inherent historical and linguistic 
relationships the word entails.  “War” today exists as part of a cohesive 
post-9/11 discourse that has formed what Foucault calls a “discursive for-
mation.” 
C. Post-9/11 Discourse as a Discursive Formation 
An origin is a single point of reference, an ultimate beginning that 
frames an entire discourse.59  The concept of an “origin” presupposes links 
of causality and continuity, and “masks both the radical discontinuity of 
‘emergences’ . . . and the discordances separating different series of dis-
course or practice.”60  While there are many propositions and ideas within a 
discourse that are in fact new emergences, irreducible to any preexisting 
formulations, there is only a single origin.61  In the aftermath of 9/11, a dis-
course has emerged that traces all causality back to that tragic day.  The pa-
 
57  See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE L.J. 1871, 1871 (2004) (discussing Pres-
ident Bush’s 2004 State of the Union address in which the President said, “I know that some people 
question if America is really in a war at all”); id. at 1872 (“To be sure, the war on terrorism isn’t as ob-
vious a rhetorical stretch as the war on poverty.” (emphasis added)); Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of 
Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 345, 346–47 (2002) 
(describing the post-9/11 “war” as “metaphorical” because a state of war cannot exist between the Unit-
ed States and al Qaeda under international ideas of warfare); Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to al 
Qaeda, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 759, 760–61 (2007) (arguing that the United States cannot, under interna-
tionally accepted definitions of war or armed conflicts, be at war with al Qaeda); cf. Williams, supra 
note 15, at 398 (“It would take a near Herculean effort, a sustained conscientious commitment to detach 
oneself from the incessant chatter of our post-9/11 world about the so-called ‘war on terror,’ to think that 
this ‘difficult time’ might mean something different . . . .”). 
58  A “syntagm” or “syntagma” is simply a linguistic unit, a collection of linguistic signs, and is used 
to connote the actual letters or words without referencing the underlying meaning of the word in any 
way.  See NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 1762.  Its plural is “syntagmata.”  Id.  
It is necessary to use this linguistic term to differentiate between the énoncé “war,” which includes its 
myriad relations to discourse, and the syntagm “war,” which is simply the three-letter word itself, di-
vorced from any relationship to discourse and, thus, divorced from meaning itself. 
59  ROGER CHARTIER, ON THE EDGE OF THE CLIFF: HISTORY, LANGUAGE, AND PRACTICES 54 (Lydia 
G. Cochrane trans., 1997). 
60  Id. 
61  See id. 
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radox that is the heart of Foucault’s insight, which this Note discusses more 
fully in Part II, is that the creation of an origin and a discursive formation 
allows self-legitimizing, historical ideas to exist within the discourse as ba-
sic, unexamined atoms, or énoncés, of the discourse.  Everything within the 
discourse relates to this singular origin, but this relation disguises the radi-
cal discontinuity between historical concepts and the current discourse.  
These inherent relationships have gone unexcavated. 
1. Post-9/11 Discourse.—Nine days after the attacks of 9/11, Presi-
dent Bush addressed Congress, saying, “Our enemy is a radical network of 
terrorists, and every government that supports them.  Our war on terror be-
gins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.  It will not end until every ter-
rorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”62  In 
defining the United States’ national security strategy, Administration offi-
cials used similar language: “The United States of America is fighting a war 
against terrorists of global reach.  The enemy is not a single political regime 
or person or religion or ideology.  The enemy is terrorism . . . .”63  Later, as 
the Administration campaigned for the war in Iraq, President Bush said, 
“We’re at war.  Iraq is part of the war on terror.  It is not the war on terror; 
it is a theater in the war on terror.”64  After being reelected, President Bush 
called Iraq the “latest battlefield” in the war on terror and continued this 
theme: 
The troops here and across the world are fighting a global war on terror.  The 
war reached our shores on September 11, 2001. . . .  After September 11, 2001, 
I told the American people that the road ahead would be difficult and that we 
would prevail.  Well, it has been difficult and we are prevailing.65 
The narratives of both the initiation of the GWOT after 9/11 and the later 
Iraq war were woven around the ideology of freedom and Western ideals,66 
 
62  President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress Following 9/11 Attacks (Sept. 
20, 2001), http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911jointsessionspeech.htm. 
63  WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2002), re-
printed in AFTER THE WAR IN IRAQ: DEFINING THE NEW STRATEGIC BALANCE 167, 176 (Shai Feldman 
ed., 2003). 
64  Moon, supra note 18, at 3 (quoting President George W. Bush at a press conference on April 13, 
2004). 
65  George W. Bush Delivers Remarks to the Nation About Iraq, CQ TRANSCRIPTIONS, June 28, 2005 
[hereinafter Bush, Remarks to the Nation], available at 6/29/05 emediapt 00:39:44 (Westlaw). 
66  See Williams, supra note 15, at 349–50 (“[F]ormer Assistant Attorney General Viet D. Dinh 
claimed that in our fight against terrorism, ‘the tradeoff between security and liberty is a false choice’ 
because our pursuit of security is defined by a single motivation, the creation of a secure space for liber-
ty to thrive.” (quoting Viet D. Dinh, Harold Leventhal Talk: Ordered Liberty in the Age of International 
Terrorism (June 7, 2002), available at http://www.bancroftassociates.net/ 
docLeventhalTalk7-7-02.pdf)); Bush, Remarks to the Nation, supra note 65 (“The terrorists who at-
tacked us and the terrorists we face murder in the name of a totalitarian ideology that hates freedom, re-
jects tolerance and despises all dissent.  Their aim is to remake the Middle East in their own grim image 
of tyranny and oppression by toppling governments, by driving us out of the region and by exporting 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 882 
against the “single enemy, terrorism,”67 thus neatly connecting it all to the 
origin of 9/11. 
Since taking office, President Obama has emphasized 9/11 as well, in 
part to support a heightened war effort in Afghanistan.  In his December 
2009 speech at West Point announcing that he would send 30,000 more 
troops to Afghanistan, President Obama continually referenced the origin of 
9/11, noting near the beginning of the speech: “We did not ask for this 
fight.  On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used 
them to murder nearly 3,000 people.”68  In his conclusion, he returned to 
this rhetorical theme: “It’s easy to forget that when this war began, we were 
united—bound together by the fresh memory of a horrific attack, and by the 
determination to defend our homeland and the values we hold dear. . . .  
America—we are passing through a time of great trial.”69  Clearly, this 
“time of great trial” began on 9/11, and the unity of that day is a continual 
reference point for all subsequent military and foreign policy decisions. 
2. Foucault’s Idea of Discourse.—“Discourse” has traditionally been 
a linguistic term, denoting a group of statements or dialogues that relate to 
one another in some way.70  However, as Professor Stuart Hall points out, 
Foucault defined discourse as 
a group of statements which provide a language for talking about—i.e. a way 
of representing—a particular kind of knowledge about a topic. . . .  Discourse 
is about the production of knowledge through language.  But . . . [s]ince all so-
cial practices entail meaning, all practices have a discursive aspect.  So dis-
course enters into and influences all social practices.71 
As Foucault recognized, discourse “constructs the topic” and bridges—or 
rejects—the traditional divide between speech and practice, between lan-
guage and conduct.72  Thus, Foucault was more interested in the referential 
space (référentiel) than in a fixed, permanent object to which a word ostens-
 
terror.  To achieve these aims, they have continued to kill: in Madrid, Istanbul, Jakarta, Casablanca, 
Riyadh, Bali and elsewhere.  The terrorists believe that free societies are essentially corrupt and deca-
dent and, with a few hard blows, they can force us to retreat.  They are mistaken.”). 
67  Moon, supra note 18, at 3. 
68  President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-
nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan. 
69  Id. 
70  See, e.g., NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 496 (defining discourse as 
“written or spoken communication or debate,” “a formal discussion of a topic in speech or writing,” and 
“a connected series of utterances; a text or conversation”). 
71  Stuart Hall, The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power, in FORMATIONS OF MODERNITY 275, 
291 (Stuart Hall & Bram Gieben eds., 1992). 
72  Id. 
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ibly refers.73  This referential space contains the rules of possibility for the 
term within a particular discourse; it is “that set of historical, practical, and 
discursive conditions which account for the existence of the object.”74  Dis-
courses are not linguistic entities that serve to organize knowledge, as the 
dictionary defines them, but rather “practices that systematically form the 
objects of which they speak.”75  Discourse theory, then, “affirm[s] the dis-
cursive character of all social practices and objects” and recognizes that 
discourses always construct the exercise of power because they necessarily 
construct oppositions and define boundaries.76 
Although we traditionally view the author of an opinion or text as de-
termining the meaning of that text, Foucault argued that the reverse often 
unconsciously occurs within a discursive formation.  The relational space 
within the text restricts the author’s authority and is the ultimate fountain-
head from which meaning emerges.  Foucault was not concerned with the 
construction of meaning through language but with the construction of 
knowledge and meaning through discourse.77  Foucault attempted to discov-
er “where meaning comes from,”78 an exercise that judges have not been 
performing in the post-9/11 context.  Undertaking such an analysis is 
a task that consists of not . . . treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying 
elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that syste-
matically form the objects of which they speak.  Of course, discourses are 
composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate 
things.  It is this more that renders them irreducible to the language (langue) 
and to speech.  It is this ‘more’ that we must reveal and describe.79 
Foucault suggested that this “more” is the hidden, relational aspect of dis-
course that most people overlook.  Within a discursive formation, the text, 
the “signs” actually construct the meaning of the discourse and determine 
the power distribution within it. 
3. Post-9/11 Discourse as Discursive Formation.—The post-9/11 
discourse is analogous to what Foucault calls a “discursive formation”—a 
unity of discourse that shares a system of relations and collateral space.  For 
Foucault, these shared relations are the provenance of a unified enunciative 
field from which text within the discursive formation draws its meaning.  
Thus, in the context of 9/11, the relationships between all aspects of the dis-
 
73  Michael Mahon, Michel Foucault’s Archaeology, Enlightenment, and Critique, 16 HUM. STUD. 
129, 136 (1993). 
74  Id. 
75  FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 49. 
76  See David Howarth & Yannis Stavrakakis, Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis, 
in DISCOURSE THEORY AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS: IDENTITIES, HEGEMONIES AND SOCIAL CHANGE 1, 4 
(David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval & Yannis Stavrakakis eds., 2000). 
77  Hall, supra note 71, at 73. 
78  See id. 
79  FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 49.  
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course—terrorism, war, national security—are the radices of a field of poss-
ible speech on which judges, scholars, and politicians draw, both conscious-
ly and unconsciously.  This same enunciative field, however, includes 
inherent historical and institutional relations that contribute to the meaning 
of the discourse and impose limits on its extent.  One can imagine this con-
cept more readily through the example of a book.  Although a novel may 
appear to be a unified and self-contained whole, it actually contains innu-
merable relations and connections.  As Foucault puts it, “The book is not 
simply the object that one holds in one’s hands; and it cannot remain within 
the little parallelepiped that contains it: its unity is variable and relative.”80  
Thus, although the GWOT may appear to be a unified whole, this unity 
must be examined, and the discursive formation must “be regarded in its 
raw, neutral state as a collection of [énoncés].”81 
Instead of viewing the world as subjective or objective or formed out 
of individual consciousness, Foucault posits “a world in which relation is 
primary; it is structures that give their objective faces to matter.”82  Thus, 
Foucault’s work recognizes that the relational aspects of discourse are not 
secondary to meaning but the essential foundations of meaning.  Foucault’s 
philosophy is relevant to the post-9/11 discussion because it is a “philoso-
phy of relation.”83  First, the post-9/11 discourse is premised on the idea of 
9/11 as an origin, a radical disruption in discourse that is the ultimate refer-
ence point for a new system of relationships.  Almost every case involving 
Guantánamo prisoners or other detainees starts with a description of or ref-
erence to the 9/11 attacks.84  In Hamdi, Justice O’Connor, writing four years 
after 9/11, immediately situated the opinion as arising out of a “difficult 
time” and proceeded to describe 9/11.  This is not to say that Justice 
O’Connor and other judges should not have referenced 9/11; one can barely 
imagine them not discussing it.  Tracing these issues back to their origin is a 
necessary endeavor.  Thus, my contention is that a single shared relation-
ship—a single origin—underlies all of the post-9/11 discourse, including 
the judicial discourse. 
Second, the post-9/11 discourse shares a referential “space in which 
various objects emerge and are continuously transformed.”85  A discursive 
formation exists when “one can discern and describe one system of disper-
sion, one type of enunciative distance, one theoretical network, [and] one 
 
80  Id. at 23. 
81  SHERIDAN, supra note 5, at 95. 
82  CHARTIER, supra note 59, at 70 (emphasis added) (quoting PAUL VEYNE, Foucault révolutionne 
l’histoire, in COMMENT ON ÉCRIT L’HISTOIRE SUIVI DE FOUCAULT RÉVOLUTIONNE L’HISTOIRE 201, 236 
(1978)). 
83  Id. (quoting VEYNE, supra note 82, at 236). 
84  See, e.g., supra Part I.B; infra Part III. 
85  FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 32. 
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field of strategic possibilities.”86  In other words, Foucault wants to describe 
the way that one views a science, such as psychology, or a work of art, such 
as a novel, as a unified whole, but he wants expand this conception to in-
clude the entire “text” of the discourse, including practices and institutional 
power relationships.87  Everything relates to the other aspects of this whole 
and appears to form an enclosed, cohesive unity.  This description perfectly 
describes the post-9/11 discourse.  As the next Part demonstrates, the issue 
of the detention of enemy combatants after 9/11 is embedded in this post-
9/11 discursive formation.  The text of judicial opinions addressing this is-
sue demonstrates agreement on its uniqueness but disagreement over its 
implications.  Although some judges have recognized the need for the ex-
cavation of discourse, most have not. 
II. THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN HABEAS LITIGATION POST-BOUMEDIENE 
In Boumediene v. Bush,88 the Supreme Court struck down the jurisdic-
tion-stripping provision of the Military Commissions Act of 1996 (MCA).89  
This decision removed the jurisdictional bar and called for district court 
judges within the D.C. Circuit to hear the merits of the habeas petitions of 
the Guantánamo prisoners.90  Although the two parties in Boumediene had 
briefed the issue of the President’s power to detain enemy combatants,91 the 
Court, as it had in Hamdi, decided not to reach that question, instead leav-
ing “the outer boundaries of war powers undefined”92 and emphasizing that 
the “opinion does not address the content of the law that governs petition-
ers’ detention.  That is a matter yet to be determined.”93  The Court explicit-
ly stated that it would “not address whether the President has authority to 
detain these petitioners” because “questions regarding the legality of the de-
tention are to be resolved in the first instance by the District Court.”94  The 
lower courts were left to interpret the AUMF in the first instance, building 
on Hamdi’s narrow holding that an individual captured on a battlefield with 
 
86  CHARTIER, supra note 59, at 57 (quoting Michel Foucault, Réponse au Cercle d’épistémologie, 
CAHIERS POUR L’ANALYSE, Summer 1968, at 9, 29). 
87  See SHERIDAN, supra note 5, at 93–97 (discussing Foucault’s idea of the discursive formation and 
its development). 
88  553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008) (holding that section 7 of the MCA “operates as an unconstitutional 
suspension of the writ [of habeas corpus]”).  For more discussion of this case, see infra Part III. 
89  28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006). 
90  See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33. 
91  Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners at 33–47, Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 (No. 06-1195). 
92  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797–98.  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion did note, however, that the 
Court may not be able to take this same approach in future cases that present the issue more pressingly.  
Id. (“Because our Nation’s past military conflicts have been of limited duration, it has been possible to 
leave the outer boundaries of war powers undefined.  If, as some fear, terrorism continues to pose dan-
gerous threats to us for years to come, the Court might not have this luxury.”). 
93  Id. at 798. 
94  Id. at 733. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 886 
a weapon could be detained as an enemy combatant.  Soon after Boume-
diene, the Fourth Circuit addressed the scope of the AUMF’s authorization 
of detention in a petition by a military prisoner held within the United 
States.  Simultaneously, the habeas petitions of Guantánamo detainees were 
addressed by multiple judges within the D.C. district courts, and the D.C. 
Circuit eventually decided the detention issue on appeal.  Although the 
courts all faced the task of interpreting the AUMF, the approaches of the 
two circuits were radically different. 
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli 
After the Boumediene decision “cleared the way,” the Fourth Circuit 
sitting en banc addressed “the scope of the President’s authority to detain 
individuals as enemy combatants”95 in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli.96  The peti-
tioner, an alleged al Qaeda operative, was attending school in the United 
States when he was arrested for social security fraud and other allegedly ter-
rorism-related crimes.97  He was subsequently transferred to military custo-
dy within the United States and labeled an “enemy combatant.”98 
A concurring opinion by Judge Motz (one of seven opinions written by 
the nine judges)99 held that the petitioner could not be defined as an enemy 
combatant under the historical laws of war and therefore had to be treated 
as a civilian.100  The strongly worded opinion argued that sanctioning execu-
tive power to detain particular individuals indefinitely under the term “un-
lawful enemy combatants” “would have disastrous consequences for the 
Constitution—and the country” and “would effectively undermine all of the 
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.”101  This opinion based its analy-
sis directly on the mutually exclusive categories of “civilians” and “comba-
tants” under the traditional law of war102 and on the narrow reasoning of 
 
95  Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 50 (D.D.C. 2009). 
96  534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated as moot sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 
1545 (2009) (mem.). 
97  See id. at 219 (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment). 
98  Id. at 219–21. 
99  The Fourth Circuit struggled with how to characterize the opinions since the four judges who 
joined Judge Motz’s concurrence held the detention of the petitioner to be unauthorized but did not 
reach the issue on which the case was eventually remanded: the framework by which the petitioner 
would be allowed to contest his detention.  See id. at 253.  Thus, this Note refers to the opinions as con-
currences and by the authors’ names to avoid confusion, although Chief Judge Williams and Judge Wil-
kinson did refer to Judge Motz’s opinion as the plurality.  Id. at 293 n.8 (Williams, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); id. at 293 n.1 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
100  See id. at 250–53 (Motz, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 217 (“Even assuming the truth of 
the Government’s allegations, they provide no basis for treating al-Marri as an enemy combatant or as 
anything other than a civilian.”). 
101  Id. at 252. 
102  See id. at 233–35. 
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Hamdi, which it argued did not unsettle this categorical approach.103  Judge 
Motz argued strenuously, and likely correctly, that the end result reached by 
the other five judges, albeit by different means, could not be formally 
aligned with precedent or with the existing categories in the laws of war.  
However, Judge Motz did not recognize the novelty of the énoncés of “war” 
and “enemy combatant” within the post-9/11 discursive formation, and she 
explicitly rejected Judge Wilkinson’s suggestion that the laws of war may 
have evolved.104 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wilkinson clearly conveyed his con-
ception of the proper judicial approach to the issue at hand and offered an 
example of the judicial archaeology for which this Note advocates.  He ar-
gued that 9/11 has obliged judges to “build a framework for this most dan-
gerous future.”105  Although he echoed the “difficult time” rhetoric 
employed by Justices O’Connor and Scalia in Hamdi,106 Judge Wilkinson 
also recognized the implications of such radical discontinuity for judicial 
action: 
This need for some legal framework is not just an opportunity.  It is our obliga-
tion. . . .  A principled framework . . . addresses the limits of executive authori-
ty.  While a minimalist method has much to commend it in many 
circumstances, it has its drawbacks here.  This is not an area where ad hoc ad-
judication provides either guidance or limits, and it leaves the most basic val-
ues of our legal system—liberty and security—in limbo.107 
Judge Wilkinson worried that a failure to thoroughly investigate the issue of 
the Executive’s power to detain would give no notice of the “permissible 
boundaries of enemy combatant detentions” and could “inflict[] grave dam-
age to the constitutional fabric at the end that none of us intended at the 
start.”108  Thus, although he traced the “most dangerous future” back to the 
origin of 9/11, he did not allow the unity of this discursive formation to ob-
scure the need to explore the foundational énoncés on which it rested, such 
as “enemy combatant.” 
Judge Wilkinson offered an in-depth exploration of the AUMF109 and 
the laws of war110 to construct this principled framework.  He responded to 
the plurality by arguing that the “classical model [of war] is just that: a clas-
 
103  See id. at 228–29 (emphasizing the narrowness of Hamdi). 
104  See id. at 245 n.24. 
105  See id. at 295 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
106  See id. at 293–96 (noting, among other things, that “we live in an age where thousands of human 
beings can be slaughtered by a single action and where large swaths of urban landscape can be leveled in 
an instant” and that “[n]uclear devices capable of inflicting enormous casualties can now fit inside a 
suitcase or a van”). 
107  Id. at 295. 
108  Id. at 296. 
109  See id. at 297–303. 
110  See id. at 315–19. 
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sical model.  War changes.  So too the law of war has not remained stat-
ic.”111  He directly addressed the precedents of Hamdi, Quirin, and Ex parte 
Milligan112 and discussed the intricacies of the law of war to formulate three 
criteria by which to determine the legal status of enemy combatants and the 
limits of executive power.113  Because his archaeological approach recog-
nized that the “obligation arises not just to ask whether, but why”114 in some 
circumstances, Judge Wilkinson attempted to excavate all of the material 
relevant to the label “unlawful enemy combatant” and to draft a definition 
to guide the political branches in their fight against terrorism.  He authorita-
tively said, “I make no apologies . . . for recognizing that there are constitu-
tional limits on the military detention power and for trying to determine 
what they are.”115  It was almost as if he anticipated the criticism of this ap-
proach that was forthcoming from the D.C. district courts. 
B. The D.C. District Courts’ Restrained Approach 
With al-Marri in the background, most of the district court judges 
within the D.C. Circuit adopted a much different view of the judicial role 
than the Fourth Circuit had, informed to a large degree by the approach of 
Judge Leon in Boumediene on remand.  Judge Leon, criticizing the ap-
proach of Judge Wilkinson and the other Fourth Circuit judges, declined to 
give in to what he described as the “temptation . . . to engage in the type of 
judicial craftsmanship . . . exhibited . . . in al-Marri.”116  Judge Leon framed 
the issue before the court as “what definition of ‘enemy combatant’ should 
be employed” and admitted that he would likely “end up somewhere in the 
middle” of the extensive briefings on the issue by both sides.117  Despite this 
framing, Judge Leon, “on further reflection,” declined to decide the issue.118  
Instead, he made the statement that became a clarion call for later judges: “I 
do not believe . . . that it is the province of the judiciary to draft defini-
tions.”119  Despite Hamdi’s narrow holding that “force” in the AUMF in-
 
111  Id. at 319; see also id. at 293 (“[L]aw must reflect the actual nature of modern warfare.  By plac-
ing so much emphasis on quaint and outmoded notions of enemy states and demarcated foreign battle-
fields, the plurality . . . misperceive[s] the nature of our present danger, and, in doing so, miss[es] the 
opportunity presented by al-Marri’s case to develop a framework for dealing with new dangers in our 
future.”). 
112  See id. at 312–29. 
113  See id. at 325 (proposing that an “enemy combatant,” by definition, “must (1) be a member of 
(2) an organization or nation against whom Congress has declared war or authorized the use of military 
force, and (3) knowingly plan[] or engage[] in conduct that harms or aims to harm persons or property 
for the purpose of furthering the military goals of the enemy nation or organization”). 
114  Id. at 312. 
115  Id. at 296. 
116  Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2008). 
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. 
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cluded a particular rationale for detention (preventing the combatant’s re-
turn to battle) and its narrow, fact-based holding that an individual caught 
with a gun on a battlefield could be considered an enemy combatant, Judge 
Leon declined to wrestle with these foundational issues, instead adopting a 
definition from the MCA concerning who would be subject to military 
commissions.120  Judge Leon then asked whether this congressional defini-
tion could be authorized instead of explicating why enemy combatants in 
the GWOT could be subjected to detention based on a broad authorization 
to use force and what the principles underlying such detention should be.121  
Whereas Judge Wilkinson saw sweeping language and the need for consti-
tutional limitations, Judge Leon did not address the constitutional concerns 
or excavate the inherent relations in “enemy combatant” and “war.”  He 
likely adopted this binary approach of “yes” or “no” because the radical 
discontinuity of these ideas was obscured by the unity of the post-9/11 dis-
cursive formation. 
In the first paragraph of Gherebi v. Obama, Judge Walton summarized 
the task before him as an attempt to ascertain “whether the President has the 
authority to detain individuals as part of its ongoing military campaign . . . 
and, if so, what is the scope of that authority.”122  However, he then adopted 
the same approach as Judge Leon, restricting himself to a binary “yes” or 
“no” decision about whether the petitioners met the government’s proposed 
definition, which Judge Walton found justified by the international laws of 
war and the AUMF, instead of fulfilling Judge Wilkinson’s obligation to 
answer why and provide principles that would actually delineate the scope 
of the Executive’s statutory and constitutional authority.123  The opinion’s 
 
120  Id. 
121  Id. (“It is our limited role to determine whether definitions crafted by either the Executive or the 
Legislative branch, or both, are consistent with the President’s authority under the [AUMF], and his war 
powers under Article II of the Constitution.  And, if the definitions are consistent with the Constitution 
and the AUMF, we must interpret the meaning of the definition as it applies to the facts in any given 
case.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); see also id. at 135 (“I will limit any further discussion re-
garding this definition to deciding any legal issues that arise in interpreting and applying the definition 
to the facts in this case.”). 
122  609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 45 (D.D.C. 2009).  The new Administration had moved for a stay soon after 
President Obama’s inauguration to reassess what arguments it would make about the President’s deten-
tion power.  Id. at 52–53.  After this consideration, the Administration slightly altered its detention stan-
dard, changing “supporting” to “substantially supported,” but it still argued that the court should take a 
minimalistic, fact-bound approach to the issue.  See id. at 53 (“However, the government believes that 
‘[i]t is neither possible nor advisable . . . to attempt to identify[ ] in the abstract[ ] the precise nature and 
degree of “substantial support,” or the precise characteristics of “associated forces.”’  Instead, it opines 
that ‘the contours of the “substantial support” and “associated forces” bases of detention will need to be 
further developed in their application to concrete facts in individual cases.’  The government recom-
mends that the Court look to ‘various analogues from traditional armed conflicts’ in deciding these indi-
vidual cases.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)). 
123  Id. at 54 (“For the reasons explained at length below, the Court agrees with the government that 
the AUMF functions as an independent basis in domestic law for the President’s asserted detention au-
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 890 
extensive background section began by invoking that familiar origin, “On 
September 11, 2001 . . . ” and then recounted that “nineteen individuals af-
filiated with the Sunni extremist movement known as al-Qaeda hijacked 
four commercial passenger jet airliners in a coordinated terrorist attack 
against this country.”124  Following this beginning, the opinion proceeded to 
describe each individual target of the 9/11 attacks and Congress’s subse-
quent passage of the AUMF.125  Judge Walton also earnestly noted that 
“remnants of the Taliban regime still wield influence” in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan and that many al Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, re-
mained at large, albeit operating “with a diminished capacity.”126 
Judge Bates’s influential opinion in Hamlily v. Obama127 appeared at 
first to take a different approach, beginning with the history of enemy com-
batants instead of the origin of 9/11.  Rather than describing the attacks and 
their aftermath, Judge Bates began by explaining that, “On March 13, 
2009, . . . the government submitted a refinement of its position with re-
spect to its authority to detain those individuals being held at Guantana-
mo.”128  The entire background section of this opinion, even the footnotes, 
discussed the evolving definitions of “enemy combatants” and the scope of 
the Executive’s detention power from Hamdi to the present and offered an 
exhaustive and impressive discussion of international law.129  However, the 
analysis section began with a “premise recently articulated by another judge 
of this Court: ‘I do not believe . . . that it is the province of the judiciary to 
draft definitions.’”130  In light of this premise, Judge Bates defined his “li-
mited role,” quoting Judge Leon, as “to determine whether definitions 
crafted by either the Executive or the Legislative branch, or both, are con-
sistent with the President’s authority under the [AUMF].”131  According to 
Judge Bates, this approach was “appropriate, if not required, given the sin-
gular role of the Executive in matters of foreign affairs and the deference 
that he is customarily given by courts when resolving matters in that 
 
thority, and adopts the basic framework advanced by the government for determining whether an indi-
vidual is subject to that authority.” (emphasis added)). 
124  Id. at 46. 
125  Id. 
126  Id.  As support for this claim, Judge Walton cited a journal article that concluded that “[m]uch of 
[al Qaeda’s] original leadership has been brought to justice in one way or another.”  Id. (first alteration 
in original) (quoting Michael Chertoff, Tools Against Terror: All of the Above, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 219, 219–21 (2009)). 
127  616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009). 
128  Id. at 67. 
129  See id. at 67–68. 
130  Id. at 68 (alterations in original) (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 
(D.D.C. 2008)) (calling this statement “[a] starting point for the analysis of this issue”). 
131  Id. at 68–69 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Boumediene, 583 F. Supp. at 134) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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realm.”132  Of course, Judge Bates never examined whether, why, or how 
the foundational principles (the “plinths”) underlying this “singular role” in 
past understandings of “foreign affairs” applied in the GWOT. 
In so doing, Judge Bates adopted not only an approach that limited the 
voice of the judiciary but also one that silenced the voices of the habeas pe-
titioners.  The petitioners had contended that the government was adopting 
“new detention standards by ‘analogy to’ the law of war,”133 and Judge 
Bates had the opportunity to engage in the iterative process of exploring 
these analogies and defining principles.  Judges often draw on the voice and 
speech of litigants to derive and hone principles through the adversarial 
process, but Judge Bates accepted Judge Walton’s exploration of the tradi-
tional categories of the law of war and refrained from engaging in an exca-
vation of the analogy.134  Although Judge Bates did eventually determine 
that one aspect of the government’s definition did not comport with the tra-
ditional law of war,135 he never addressed possible constitutional limitations 
or excavated the concept of “enemy combatant” as it existed within the 
post-9/11 discourse.  He followed the binary approach of saying “yes” to 
part of the government’s definition and “no” to the other without really ex-
ploring the why, i.e., the animating principles, of the definition itself. 
Similarly, in setting forth the scope of the government’s detention 
power that would govern the merits of the case, Chief Judge Lamberth in 
Mattan v. Obama noted that “[t]he Court’s role here is not to fashion its 
own framework, but only to determine whether respondents’ proposed 
framework is, as respondents claim, consistent with domestic law and the 
laws of war.”136  As support for this proposition concerning the role of the 
judiciary, he cited the Government’s brief, which claimed that its detention 
power was based on the AUMF and informed by the historical categories of 
the laws of war, as well as Judge Leon’s claim that it is not the “province” 
of the judiciary to draft definitions.137 
Two months later, in July 2009, Judge Kollar-Kotelly addressed anoth-
er habeas petition on the merits.138  Although she did not cite Judge Leon’s 
statement or Mattan’s rephrasing of it, she framed the issue as whether the 
petitioner was “lawfully detained in the context of the following standard,” 
and the standard she quoted was a near-verbatim recounting of the govern-
ment’s definition, omitting only the “substantial support” provisions that 
Judge Bates had rejected in Hamlily.139  In September 2009, Judge Hogan, 
 
132  Id. at 69. 
133  Id. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
134  See id. at 69. 
135  See id. 
136  618 F. Supp. 2d 24, 26 (D.D.C. 2009). 
137  See id. 
138  See Al Mutairi v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2009). 
139  See id. at 85 & nn.5–6. 
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addressing a dispute over the framework that would guide the court’s in-
quiry in a similar habeas petition, quoted both Chief Judge Lamberth’s 
statement that the court’s only role is to “determine whether respondents’ 
proposed framework is, as respondents claim, consistent with domestic law 
and the laws of war”140 and Judge Leon’s assertion that it is not the role of 
the judiciary “to draft definitions.”141 
Thus, despite the recognition of the existence of “unresolved questions 
about the scope of the government’s detention authority”142 and the recogni-
tion that the Supreme Court has “provided ‘scant guidance’ as to whom [the 
President] may lawfully detain,”143 courts have continued to follow the bi-
nary approach of Judge Leon by adopting the government’s proposed defi-
nition of “enemy combatant” and asking whether it is authorized by the 
AUMF without addressing constitutional objections to or the nuances of 
“enemy combatant.”  The district courts have declined to excavate the 
foundations of the concepts, such as war and national security, on which 
they have relied, and they have refused to construct a framework as Judge 
Wilkinson did.  Although the Hamdi and Boumediene Courts appeared to 
envision the lower courts defining the limits of executive power and erect-
ing constitutional principles to inform their application,144 the district courts 
instead confined themselves to “yes” or “no” answers to the question of 
whether.  Only Gherebi investigated the “longstanding law-of-war prin-
ciples”145 in any significant way, but it did so only to essentially say “no” to 
the petitioner’s arguments.146  This lack of excavation represents silence on 
the part of the courts and also silences the contributions of the petitioners 
and their attorneys.  Were the courts to engage in creating a principled 
framework, they would benefit from each petitioner picking up on these le-
gal principles, testing them, and invoking them in slightly different factual 
situations.147  Neither Judge Walton nor any of the other judges attempted to 
excavate the discourse and construct an affirmative framework. 
 
140  Anam v. Obama, 653 F. Supp. 2d 62, 63 (D.D.C. 2009) (emphasis added) (quoting Mattan, 618 
F. Supp. 2d at 26) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
141  Id. (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2008)). 
142  Abdah v. Obama, 708 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 n.2 (D.D.C. 2010). 
143  Id. at 12 (quoting Al-Bihani v. Obama (Al-Bihani I), 590 F.3d 866, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
144  See supra text accompanying notes 42–55, 90–94. 
145  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004). 
146  Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 55–71 (D.D.C. 2009). 
147  See Justin Florence, Substantive Detention Law Matters: The Big Questions About Guantanamo 
the Supreme Court Should Answer, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. ONLINE 7 (2008), 
http://hlpronline.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Florence_Substantive_Detention_Law.pdf 
(arguing that the Supreme Court in Boumediene should provide a framework outlining the substantive 
law of detention so that detainees can develop a legal strategy). 
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C. The D.C. Circuit Speaks 
Against this backdrop, a panel of the D.C. Circuit addressed the post-
Boumediene habeas litigation for the first time in Al-Bihani v. Obama.148  At 
the outset of its analysis, the panel recognized that the case presented an 
overarching question concerning the detention of Guantánamo detainees.  
Instead of framing the issue as an analysis of the President’s detention pow-
er, the court stated only that its first issue “concerns whom the President 
can lawfully detain.”149  Although the distinction may simply be semantic, 
this phrasing seems to approach the question more indirectly than flatly ask-
ing “whom the President can lawfully detain.”  The second phrasing implies 
crafting a definition, while the first only concerns such a definition.  The 
majority opinion concluded its introduction by stating its purpose: “In this 
decision, we aim to narrow the legal uncertainty that clouds military deten-
tion.”150  Thus, from the beginning the court admitted that it would not at-
tempt to clarify the law or even try to eliminate the uncertainty but would 
only “narrow” the confusion.  Instead of conducting the archaeological ex-
cavation for which this Note advocates, the court relied on the formal, self-
legitimizing énoncés of the post-9/11 discourse. 
Surprisingly, the majority opinion departed from Hamdi’s statement, 
honored at length by Gherebi and the other D.C. district court opinions that 
the laws of war inform at least some aspects of the detention power under 
the AUMF.151  In Hamdi, Justice O’Connor had found that the law of war 
allowed detention, at least for the “duration of the particular conflict,”152 and 
though she did not clearly hold that the laws of war limited the President’s 
detention power under the AUMF,153 she clearly did give them some weight 
in her interpretation.154  The court emphatically stated that there is “no indi-
cation . . . that Congress intended the international laws of war to act as ex-
tra-textual limiting principles for the President’s war powers under the 
 
148  Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d 866. 
149  Id. at 870 (emphasis added). 
150  Id. 
151  See id. at 885 (Williams, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that the 
majority’s approach “appears hard to square with the approach that the Supreme Court took in Hamdi”). 
152  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004). 
153  See Al-Bihani v. Obama (Al-Bihani II), 619 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concur-
ring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Hamdi never stated that the AUMF incorporates judicially en-
forceable international-law limits on the President’s authority, which of course would have been a 
momentous and unprecedented holding.”); id. at 43 (“Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Hamdi 
carefully avoided stating that any action contrary to international-law norms would not be authorized 
under the AUMF.”). 
154  See id. at 43 (noting the difficulty in interpreting Justice O’Connor’s “isolated references” to in-
ternational law); id. at 54–55 (Williams, J., commenting on the denial of rehearing en banc) (distinguish-
ing between international law as domestic law that limits Executive detention and international law as 
normative law that guides a court’s interpretation and arguing that Hamdi “use[d] international law as an 
interpretive tool”). 
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AUMF.”155  As added support, the opinion noted that Congress has not im-
plemented the law of war domestically and cited the Third Restatement of 
Foreign Relations.156  Furthermore, the court refused to “quibble” over va-
gue treaties and amorphous customary international law because these laws 
of war lacked the “controlling legal force and firm definition” that are ne-
cessary when “courts seek to determine the limits of the President’s war 
powers.”157  In other words, the majority opinion seemed to say that the ju-
diciary must have a firm definition from an outside source and cannot exca-
vate the numerous historical and contemporary sources on both 
international and domestic law to draft an appropriate definition itself.158  
Thus, the panel implied that it viewed the case as a vehicle to define the 
limits of the President’s power, but it later retreated, finding “no occasion 
here to explore the outer bounds”159 of the definition of an unlawful enemy 
combatant. 
Although it may have been correct in its assertion that international law 
did not limit the interpretation of the AUMF,160 the lack of some other law 
forcing the court to consider extratextual limits would not necessarily imply 
 
155  Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d at 871. 
156  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 111(3)–(4) (1987)). 
157  See id. (emphasis added). 
158  For an argument that the D.C. Circuit ignores precedent establishing a responsibility to interpret 
international law that the Supreme Court has recognized since it set out an appendix to guide the capture 
of prize cases, see John Dehn, The Relevance of International Law to (the Substantive and Procedural 
Rules of) Preventive Detention in Armed Conflict—A Rejoinder to Al-Bihani, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 29, 
2010, 8:37 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/01/29/the-relevance-of-international-law-to-the-substantive-
and-procedural-rules-of-preventive-detention-in-armed-conflict-–-a-rejoinder-to-al-bihani (“The Court 
[has] provided, in what might be viewed as in part an advisory opinion on the law and in part a promul-
gation of rules of procedure, . . . a heavily referenced mini-treatise . . . of the international[ ]rules go-
verning prize practice, including substantive rules, evidentiary standards and modes of proof.  The panel 
opinion in al-Bihani both embraces and ignores this tradition.”).  See also Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d at 54 
(Williams, J., commenting on the denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that Hamdi followed a long and 
accepted history of using international law to interpret a statute even if the international law does not 
have binding force). 
159  Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d at 874. 
160  I call this an assertion because, in the denial of rehearing, seven judges signed a joint statement 
denying rehearing because they found that the international law aspect of the panel’s decision was not a 
holding, but merely dicta.  Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d at 1 (Sentelle, C.J., concurring in the denial of rehear-
ing en banc) (“We decline to en banc this case to determine the role of international law-of-war prin-
ciples in interpreting the AUMF because, as the various opinions issued in the case indicate, the panel’s 
discussion of that question is not necessary to the disposition of the merits.”); see Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d 
at 885–86 (Williams, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (calling the international law 
aspect of the majority opinion dicta).  However, the author of the Al-Bihani I panel decision, Judge 
Brown, disagreed with this characterization and argued that this aspect of the opinion was an alternative 
holding that enjoyed precedential effect.  As such, she called the contrary characterization in the joint 
statement of the other judges a “cryptic statement that exhibits no apparent function other than to mysti-
fy.”  Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d at 2 (Brown, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
105:869  (2011) Post-Boumediene Habeas Litigation 
 895 
that courts should refrain from interpreting an extremely broad statute161 in 
order to give it some definition.  As Judge Wilkinson recognized, the inter-
pretation of “enemy combatant” is of crucial importance to give notice to 
Congress and the Executive in their conduct of future hostilities.  Although 
the D.C. Circuit implied it was seeking to “determine the limits,” one may 
question whether an occasion do so will ever arise under a judicial approach 
that only engages in such interpretation if forced to do so.  Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court explicitly charged the lower courts with defining the “per-
missible bounds” of the “enemy combatant” label.162  The Court likely rec-
ognized that avoidance in the lower courts leads to a less robust body of 
lower court law to mine for an ideal rule.163 
The petitioner in Al-Bihani also argued, somewhat unpersuasively, that 
his ongoing detention was unjustifiable because the hostilities in which he 
had allegedly participated had technically ended.164  In response, the majori-
ty opinion emphasized that the determination that hostilities have ceased is 
a political question on which a court should “defer to the Executive’s opi-
nion.”165  As support for this proposition, the court cited Ludecke v. Watkins, 
which asked whether the Alien Enemy Act permitted the President to detain 
a German citizen in 1948 after the actual fighting of World War II had 
ended.166  The Ludecke Court noted that the termination of a “state of war” 
with another country is a political question, as it involved “foreign policy” 
and “national security.”167  The Al-Bihani majority failed to mention, how-
ever, that the Ludecke Court explicitly distinguished the political determina-
tion that a “state of war” had ended from the question of whether active 
hostilities had ceased.168  Although a determination of when hostilities end 
may also be a determination for which deference is due the Executive, for 
either constitutional or pragmatic reasons, the point is that the majority pan-
el failed to discuss the differences between the historical, formal idea of a 
“state of war” and the hostilities that are part of this new kind of “war.”  
 
161  See al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 297–98 (2008) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (noting the broad power the AUMF gives the President), vacated as moot sub 
nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.). 
162  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004). 
163  See Michael S. Catlett, Note, Clearly Not Established: Decisional Law and the Qualified Im-
munity Doctrine, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031, 1051 (2005) (“Sometimes a legal issue is better fleshed out 
when it is considered by multiple judges with differing viewpoints. . . .  ‘The many circuit courts act as 
the “laboratories” of new or refined legal principles . . . providing the Supreme Court with a wide array 
of approaches to legal issues and thus, hopefully, with the raw material from which to fashion better 
judgments.’” (quoting J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution 
Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 929 (1983))). 
164  See Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d at 871. 
165  Id. at 874. 
166  Id. 
167  Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 168–69, 170 & n.15 (1948) (citations omitted) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
168  See id. at 166–70 & n.10. 
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Remarkably, as Judge Williams’s concurrence noted, the Al-Bihani court 
had no reason to reach the question of what deference was due to the Ex-
ecutive’s assertion that hostilities had not ended.169  Based on common 
sense and on the international laws of war, which were discussed extensive-
ly in the parties’ briefs,170 the hostilities in Afghanistan were still ongoing.  
Although the court found no occasion to address the limits of the Presi-
dent’s power, it seemed to endeavor mightily to highlight the deference the 
judiciary should adopt when approaching such matters.  The panel likely 
felt so constrained because of the “wide deference the judiciary is obliged to 
give . . . with regard to questions concerning national security.”171 
Judge Brown’s concurrence epitomizes the passive approach some 
members of the judiciary have taken in the post-Boumediene line of cases.  
Calling it “fortunate” that the case did not require the court “to demarcate 
the law’s full substantive and procedural dimensions,” she essentially 
pleaded for Congress to legislate on the matter.172  Her concurrence ques-
tioned whether a court-driven process is appropriate where the “cases 
present hard questions and hard choices, ones best faced directly.”173  The 
underlying assumption of her argument, then, was that the judiciary should 
not face such questions directly, neither as a tenet of political theory nor as 
one of judicial ability.  She emphasized that the “legal issues presented by 
our nation’s fight with this enemy have been numerous, difficult, and to a 
large extent novel,”174 thus making this difficult time “particularly ripe for 
Congress to intervene.”175  Echoing the recurring theme that 9/11 is the ori-
gin of a new era, Judge Brown concluded with the recognition that “[t]his 
war has placed us not just at, but already past the leading edge of a new and 
frightening paradigm, one that demands new rules be written.”176  Thus, 
even though she realized that war is a challenge to law and that “old wine-
skins” and “prior frameworks” were “ill-suited to the bitter wine of this new 
warfare,”177 for her this realization meant that the judiciary was helpless and 
its hands were tied. 
Like Judge Leon in Boumediene, Judge Brown appeared to believe that 
the judiciary should not or cannot itself adapt existing precedents and old 
 
169  See Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d at 882–83 (Williams, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (maintaining that the “petitioner’s detention is legally permissible by virtue of facts that he 
himself has conceded” so that the majority had no reason to reach the procedural questions of due 
process). 
170  See Brief for Appellees at 21–52, Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d 866 (No. 09-5051); see also Al-Bihani I, 
590 F.3d at 874 (majority opinion) (noting the petitioner’s reliance on the laws of war). 
171  Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d at 875 (emphasis added). 
172  See id. at 881–82 (Brown, J., concurring). 
173  Id. at 882. 
174  Id. 
175  Id. 
176  Id. 
177  Id. 
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wineskins to new situations.  Rather, the judiciary should passively say 
“yes” or “no” to government definitions.  Perhaps she was drawing heavily 
on the legal process school of thinking, which argues that in times of war or 
other crises the judiciary should defer to any act passed by both political 
branches178 or other arguments based on deference to expert agencies.179  
Later in the denial of rehearing, however, she clearly rejected any notion 
that the court was giving deference to the Executive’s interpretation of the 
AUMF because the Obama Administration had argued that international 
law did play a role in its interpretation.180  In her original concurrence, she 
did not cite any of the scholarship on the rationale underlying deference and 
offered no archaeological defense of this deference but instead relied solely 
on the applicability of past analogies.  However, like Judge Wilkinson, she 
clearly realized that 9/11 had ushered in a “new and frightening paradigm” 
and that the post-9/11 habeas litigation demanded “new rules,” implicitly 
recognizing the radical discontinuity created by 9/11.  She perceived this 
novelty only as a demand on Congress, though, and not as a judicial obliga-
tion. 
Judge Brown’s concurrence may be the best example of the way that 
the post-9/11 discursive formation has shaped the role of the judiciary.  Al-
though one could disagree with her ideology or legal conclusions, the oper-
ation driving these opinions and this approach to the judicial task is deeper 
than ideology or logical propositions.  The discursive formation shapes the 
judges’ approaches, which in turn reinforce the inherent institutional ar-
rangements within the discursive formation.181  Foucault’s The Archaeology 
 
178  See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive 
Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES 
L. 1, 35 (2004) (“This is a democratic-process based view that emphasizes that the judicial role in re-
viewing assertions of power during exigent circumstances should focus on ensuring whether there has 
been bilateral institutional endorsement for the exercise of such powers—rather than a view that the 
judicial role should be to determine on its own the substantive content and application of ‘rights’ during 
wartime.  This is not a view that might please more abstract academic ‘rights theorists,’ be they political 
philosophers or constitutional theorists.”). 
179  See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs 
Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 180, 199–205 (2006) (presenting a func-
tionalist argument for deference to Executive Branch interpretations of laws affecting foreign affairs, 
rather than relying solely on the “solid and undisputed formal pedigree” of such deference); Jide Nze-
libe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941 (2004) (undertaking a thorough analysis 
of institutional advantages in dealing with foreign affairs and identifying categories of issues more 
suited to judicial determination and those on which the judiciary should abstain). 
180  Al-Bihani II, 619 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en 
banc) (“Contrary to the government’s claim, its preferred statutory interpretation warrants no deference 
from this court.”). 
181  See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 
1013, 1030 (2008) (“Having invited Congress to fix things, for example, the Court has put itself in an 
institutionally weaker position to later strike down Congress’s fix on rights-based grounds.  Moreover, 
having applied the law of war to al Qaeda detainees, the Court has made it difficult to later find that the 
‘war on terror’ may not really be a war at all.  And the Court has done so without the benefit of fully 
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of Knowledge describes the way the text of a discourse actually constructs 
its meaning and distributes institutional power, and his insights expose the 
way that the post-9/11 discourse has altered the judicial role in these habeas 
cases.  Instead of conducting a principled, archaeological investigation and 
constructing a framework for executive power, judges believe that they are 
inherently unable or ill-suited to answer these difficult questions directly.  
The unexamined foundations of the discourse—the énoncés—have com-
pelled this approach because their inherent, referential spaces have defined 
the meaning of the text and the discourse. 
III. THE ÉNONCÉ AND THE POST-9/11 DISCURSIVE FORMATION 
Foucault uses the word énoncé in The Archaeology of Knowledge to 
represent the basic “atom of discourse”182 and the foundational element of 
any discursive formation.  Although énoncé is typically translated as 
“statement” or “utterance,” Foucault actually uses this French neologism to 
avoid any past associations or latent meaning in a word with an already 
fixed meaning.183  A sentence, a jumble of letters, or another material enun-
ciation becomes an énoncé through an anterior relation that arises from an 
enunciative field of discourse, a discourse limited and ordered according to 
a network of interwoven relationships.184  Even images can become énoncés 
if they become the historical rules and relationships, the individual units, by 
which a unified discursive formation is held together.185  While a name de-
signates an individual and a proposition has a referent, an énoncé has no 
correlate: 
It is linked rather to a ‘referential’ that is made up not of ‘things’, ‘facts’, ‘real-
ities’, or ‘beings’, but of laws of possibility, rules of existence for the objects 
that are named, designated, or described within it and for the relations that are 
affirmed or denied in it.  The referential of the statement forms the place, the 
condition, the field of emergence, the authority to differentiate between indi-
viduals or objects, states of things and relations that are brought into play by 
 
considering the substantive or rights-based arguments.”); Sarah L. Lochner, Comment, Qualified Im-
munity, Constitutional Stagnation, and the Global War on Terror, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 829, 867 (2011) 
(“[J]udicial avoidance maneuvers can bind the judiciary to a certain decisional path without a full deli-
berative process.”). 
182  FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 80. 
183  See Deleuze Interview, supra note 4, at 20–21 & n.1. 
184  See SHERIDAN, supra note 5, at 100 (discussing the differences between statements (énoncés) 
and sentences, propositions, and other enunciations). 
185  See ALEC MCHOUL & WENDY GRACE, A FOUCAULT PRIMER: DISCOURSE, POWER AND THE 
SUBJECT 37 (1993) (discussing the Latin conjugation of amare as an énoncé, as well as the periodic ta-
ble and a pricing schedule); J.G. MERQUIOR, FOUCAULT 80–81 (2d ed. 1991) (discussing Foucault’s 
conception of the énoncé and giving the example of a taxonomic table or a genealogic tree as possible 
énoncés). 
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the statement itself; it defines possibilities of appearance and delimitation of 
that which gives meaning to the sentence, a value as truth to the proposition.186 
Thus, one of the principal insights of Foucault’s Archaeology is its recogni-
tion that individual elements within an enclosed discursive formation can-
not be analyzed in isolation, separated from the discursive relations they 
entail.  Two identical linguistic expressions, or syntagmata, spoken or writ-
ten in different times or in different relational contexts, may be two distinct 
énoncés.  Foucault offers the simple examples of the claim that the world is 
round made before and after Copernicus or the claim that species evolve 
made before and after Darwin187: “[I]t is not . . . that the meaning of the 
words has changed; what changed was the relation of these affirmations to 
other propositions, their conditions of use and reinvestment, the field of ex-
perience, of possible verifications, of problems to be resolved, to which 
they can be referred.”188  Énoncés, then, are “not . . . fixed components” that 
can be grasped; they can only be understood through the rules that govern 
their appearance and scope within a discourse.189 
While other philosophers before him argued that language cannot be 
viewed in isolation from its creation, its author, its unconscious, its history, 
and its context,190 Foucault, building on these insights, argues that all of 
these relations are present in the text of the discourse itself.  He suggested 
that the relations of an énoncé to formulations with which it appears, formu-
lations to which it refers, formulations whose subsequent possibility it de-
termines, and formulations that share its status create a “collateral space” 
that borders, delineates, and, in turn, helps create the discursive forma-
tion.191 
A. The Enunciative Field of the Post-9/11 Discursive Formation 
For Foucault, “a sequence of linguistic elements is a[n] [énoncé] only 
if it is immersed in an enunciative field . . . in which it has a place and a sta-
tus, which arranges for its possible relations with the past, and which opens 
up for it a possible future.”192  The philosopher Gilles Deleuze, writing 
 
186  FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 91. 
187  Id. at 103. 
188  Id. 
189  See MCHOUL & GRACE, supra note 185, at 38. 
190  See, e.g., JACQUES LACAN, The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis, 
in ÉCRITS: A SELECTION 31, 84 (Bruce Fink trans., 2006) (“For the function of language in speech is not 
to inform but to evoke.”); ED PLUTH, SIGNIFIERS AND ACTS: FREEDOM IN LACAN’S THEORY OF THE 
SUBJECT 29–32 (2007) (discussing Lacan’s separation of Saussure’s “sign” and “signifier” and his em-
phasis on the relation of language and the unconscious); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 7, 75, 148 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 2001) (seeking to bring into prominence 
the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a “form of life,” and not simply a repre-
sentative function). 
191  See FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 97–99. 
192  Id. at 99. 
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about Foucault’s insights, outlines the three forms of “spaces” that are dis-
cursively incorporated in an énoncé: the “collateral space,” which is formed 
from other statements that are a part of a discursive formation;193 the “cor-
relative space,” which consists of “certain intrinsic positions” associated 
with the statement;194 and the “complementary space,” which consists of 
nondiscursive formations, including social practices and the “institutional 
milieu.”195  This section demonstrates that these three spaces are all present 
within the post-9/11 discursive formation, but judges have barely acknowl-
edged their existence, much less excavated their influence on the discourse, 
in the current habeas litigation. 
1. Post-9/11 Énoncés and Collateral Space.—Within the post-9/11 
discursive formation, one énoncé that has consistently appeared is the idea 
of “national security.”  Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Hamdi and 
the multiple opinions in al-Marri emphasized the traditional deference to 
the Executive in matters of national security, and most of the habeas cases 
in the district courts picked up this idea as well.  Judge Brown’s majority 
opinion for the D.C. Circuit in Al-Bihani clearly based its deference to the 
Executive on the historical idea of national security, noting the “wide defe-
rence” due when national security is at issue.196 
The collateral space of 9/11 is a vastly different collateral space than 
the collateral space in which “national security” has historically been si-
tuated, as the references to Egan and Youngstown in Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion demonstrate.  Similarly, the énoncés of war and unlawful enemy 
combatants are now embedded in the collateral space of this post-9/11 dis-
course, which is distinct from the space delineating the discourse during 
Quirin and other wartime contexts.  The terrorist activities and structure of 
al Qaeda, presidential action in this GWOT, the political and cultural de-
bates surrounding Guantánamo and military trials, and the role that the ju-
diciary has assumed within this discursive formation are all components of 
this collateral space that contribute to the référentiel and the enunciative 
field that construct the meaning of these terms.  Although the Obama Ad-
ministration has officially dropped the terms “enemy combatants”197 and 
“Global War on Terror,”198 the removal of these syntagmata from the offi-
 
193  See DELEUZE, supra note 10, at 4–5. 
194  Id. at 6. 
195  Id. at 9. 
196  See Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d 866, 875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
197  See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 66 n.2 (D.D.C. 2009); Del Quentin Wilber & Peter 
Finn, U.S. Retires ‘Enemy Combatant,’ Keeps Broad Right to Detain, WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2009, at 
A6. 
198  See Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, ‘Global War on Terror’ Is Given New Name, WASH. POST (Mar. 
25, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html 
(“In a memo e-mailed this week to Pentagon staff members, the Defense Department’s office of security 
review noted that ‘this administration prefers to avoid using the term “Long War” or “Global War on 
Terror.”  Please use “Overseas Contingency Operation.”’”). 
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cial discourse does not entail the extinction of the énoncés within the dis-
cursive formation. 
For the Obama Administration, the énoncé of “enemy combatant” had 
become too unwieldy, too heavily imbued with relations to international 
law, Bush Administration policies, Supreme Court cases, and the judicial 
system itself.  New relations and exclusions had altered the enunciative 
field it inhabited and, as a result, altered the locations of its authority and 
privilege.  Therefore, the Obama Administration, beginning with Hamlily, 
simply offered a definition of “those individuals” that may be detained pur-
suant to the AUMF.199  In other words, as Foucault envisioned, the Obama 
Administration altered the language, the syntagmata used, but the énoncé 
has survived.  The Obama Administration is relying on the same concept, 
“those individuals being held at Guantanamo,” without using the words 
“enemy combatant.”200  The énoncé is still present in the discourse and con-
tinually interacting within the discursive formation. 
In the same way, scholars who regard discourse as a creation of indi-
vidual actors have viewed the post-9/11 discourse as the active creation or 
interpretation of the Executive Branch during this period.201  However, Fou-
cault’s conception of a discursive formation does not involve a “subject” or 
“author” of a discourse.  Although some may characterize the Bush Admin-
istration as purposefully having chosen rhetoric and language in order to 
carve out more executive power, Foucault “places [at] centre stage . . . [the] 
discursive formations.”202  He inverts the traditional perspective of a subject 
or source creating knowledge or defining language and instead focuses on 
the way the impersonal discourse creates subjects.203  “Discourses and prac-
tices . . . are seen as having a dynamic and momentum of their own, through 
their principle of organization.  It is this dynamic and organization which 
becomes the target of study.”204  The collateral space inherent in the post-
9/11 discourse, then, contributes to the meaning and enunciative field of the 
énoncés.  Although the statements and policies of Presidents Bush and Ob-
ama are obviously a part of this collateral space, so are all of the other ele-
ments and relationships within the post-9/11 discursive formation.  
“National security,” “war,” and “enemy combatants” cannot be fully un-
derstood without unearthing and analyzing all of these relationships. 
 
199  See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 67; see also id. at 73 (“[T]he government no longer seeks to de-
tain petitioners on the basis that they are ‘enemy combatants.’”). 
200  Id. at 67. 
201  See, e.g., Jennifer Bond, The Language of War: A Battle of Words at Guantanamo Bay, 
10 APPEAL: REV. CURRENT L. & L. REFORM 70, 73–75 (2005). 
202  MARGARET WETHERELL & JONATHAN POTTER, MAPPING THE LANGUAGE OF RACISM: 
DISCOURSE AND THE LEGITIMATION OF EXPLOITATION 82 (1992). 
203  See id. 
204  Id. 
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For instance, what does “national security” mean in relation to the idea 
of terrorism, arguably another énoncé within the discourse?  Despite the 
fact that concerns about national security have served as a backdrop to all of 
this litigation, the district courts have thus far deemed a particular individu-
al’s threat to national security inapplicable to the analysis of the extent of 
detention authorized by the AUMF.  After recounting other court decisions, 
Judge Hogan held in Anam v. Obama that national security had no impact 
on the President’s detention power because “mention of the threat the indi-
vidual poses to the national security” was “[a]bsent” from the discourse.205  
Because the historical, formal idea of executive detention did not include 
this consideration and the “conflict ha[d] not ended,” Judge Hogan impo-
tently concluded that “the Court’s hands are tied.”206  Another case echoed 
this approach, noting that the “question of whether the petitioner poses a 
threat to the United States’ national security is one the district courts have 
not found determinative, or even relevant, in ruling on the merits of habeas 
petitions.”207  To be sure, this kind of individualized threat to national secu-
rity is distinct from a more general understanding of the threat posed by ter-
rorism to national security.  Arguably, though, the phrase “national 
security” has an added dimension when viewed within the post-9/11 discur-
sive formation that includes terrorism, al Qaeda, and radical Islam.208  
Courts have refrained from determining whether it does have an added di-
mension and have refused to recognize the powerful effect the collateral 
space of a discursive formation can have. 
2. Post-9/11 Énoncés and Correlative Space.—Historical references 
and other relationships outside of the post-9/11 discursive formation com-
pose the correlative space that informs these énoncés.  The history of the 
linguistic syntagm “unlawful enemy combatants” offers insight into the 
transformative power of discourse.  In Quirin, the “law” root of the word 
“unlawful” referred (Foucault might say “related”) to the laws of war as 
they applied to soldiers in an enemy force;209 these laws were considered 
part of the collateral space within the same discursive formation.  Within 
the context of the Quirin opinion, by necessity, the term “unlawful” ex-
cluded any relation to civil war or other noninternational armed conflict and 
 
205  Anam v. Obama, 696 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010). 
206  Id. 
207  Al-Adahi v. Obama, 698 F. Supp. 2d 48, 53 (D.D.C. 2010). 
208  See, e.g., Joseph Margulies, Opinion, The Myth of the Superhuman Terrorist, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 
23, 2009, at 31.  Professor Margulies discusses the way that a common perception of al Qaeda terrorists 
has taken form within the consciousness of the American public: “Within days of the Sept. 11, 2001, 
attacks, an image of the Muslim terrorist took shape in American society.  He is less than human—a 
barbarian who has renounced the conventions of civilized behavior.  Yet he is also more than human.  At 
special camps and schools, he has trained his mind and body to perfection.  He has the strength of Her-
cules and the skill of Houdini.”  Id. 
209  See supra text accompanying notes 24–29. 
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explicitly existed only within the discourse of international war, specifically 
in relation to World War II.  The post-9/11 discursive formation retained 
the general relation to war as part of the correlative, historical space but also 
incorporated the numerous relations and exclusions already present in the 
enunciative field of post-9/11 discourse, i.e. the collateral space composed 
of terrorism, national security, al Qaeda, and the rest of the post-9/11 dis-
cursive formation.  While the term “unlawful enemy combatant” under the 
historical understanding necessarily included the category of a lawful com-
batant as an antithesis, the term within the post-9/11 discursive formation 
appears to have no such correlate. 
A discursive formation with its specific enunciative field may, despite 
the “most manifest semantic, grammatical, or formal identities, define a 
threshold beyond which there can be no further equivalence, and the ap-
pearance of a new [énoncé] must be recognized.”210  One may argue that 
“national security” and “unlawful enemy combatants” before and after 9/11 
are identical énoncés, but as this Note argues, no judge has actually made 
the effort to determine this identity.  Instead, the unity of the linguistic syn-
tagmata is assumed and the terms become self-legitimizing “atom[s] of dis-
course”211 beyond which no one probes more deeply.  Anytime one of these 
énoncés appears within the post-9/11 discursive formation, it includes this 
historical correlative space, which, in turn, constructs the possibilities of its 
meaning. 
3. Post-9/11 Énoncés and Complementary Space.—Finally, the 
“complementary space” refers to the nondiscursive institutions and practic-
es that also form part of the text of a discursive formation.  One of the chief 
contributions of Foucault’s methodology, and one of the reasons it is so ap-
plicable to the post-9/11 judicial role, is Foucault’s realization that the 
words themselves define the power relations, which, in turn, construct the 
meaning of a term.  The enunciative field includes certain institutional pow-
er relationships and the authority to speak, which are influenced, in turn, by 
the collateral and correlative spaces.  The complementary space determines 
who has the power to control the application of an énoncé like “national se-
curity” or “unlawful enemy combatant” in practice.  Thus this aspect of the 
enunciative field sets the rules for who can define the term, contains the 
possibilities inherent in the label, and consequently excludes other potential 
authorities or possibilities. 
For example, the term “unlawful enemy combatant,” based on Quirin 
and other precedent, has thus far operated as an unexamined énoncé, an 
atom of discourse that has constructed the power relations between the 
branches of government.  The énoncé imports a historical set of institutional 
 
210  FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 103; see also DELEUZE, supra note 10, at 7–8 (noting that the “dis-
cursive object” of an énoncé is “defined precisely by the limits to the lines of variation”). 
211  FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 80. 
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relationships into the discursive formation as part of its complementary 
space in the same way it imports discursive relationships as part of its colla-
teral and correlative spaces.  The term constructs the institutional relation-
ships between detainees and the government, excludes potential existing 
relationships (such as criminal to prosecutor), and ultimately determines 
both who has the authority to speak and the limits of such speech. 
One such limit inherent in the post-9/11 discursive formation is the ex-
clusion of the criminal discourse.  Each discursive formation necessarily en-
tails exclusions of other discourses and other referential fields by its 
allocation of power.  Although some officials within the Clinton Adminis-
trations in the 1990s began to advocate military action against al Qaeda, ter-
rorism was almost universally considered a crime before 9/11.212  
Furthermore, the detention and trial of individual terrorists for individual 
terrorist acts in the United States and other countries was almost exclusively 
handled in the civilian criminal context until 9/11.213  Crime focuses on 
conduct, on specific actions, not membership in a military or other group,214 
but the detainees in Guantánamo (who cannot be “prisoners” because that 
label is excluded by the complementary space of the discursive formation) 
are part of or associated with an organization that is the target of U.S. mili-
tary action.  To understand the exclusion one only has to imagine a soldier 
who kills an enemy soldier on a battlefield; such a soldier cannot be guilty 
of murder because he is only fulfilling the duty of war.  There can be no 
crime when such an action occurs within the discourse of war.   
At least one judge attempted to excavate this exclusion and draw atten-
tion to the impact of discourse.  After the Court in Rasul v. Bush gave the 
lower courts jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from Guantánamo detai-
 
212  See, e.g., Upendra D. Acharya, War on Terror or Terror Wars: The Problem in Defining Terror-
ism, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 653, 664–73 (2009) (tracing the development of the international de-
finition of terrorism as a criminal act before and after 9/11, despite the shift in the United States’ 
conception); id. at 670 (“The subsequent open endorsement and naked pursuit of a ‘War on Terror’ is a 
convenient and expedient shift from terrorism as a crime to terrorism as an act of war.”); Robert Ches-
ney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1094–96 (2008) (explaining that, although there had been “a growing realization 
that modern terrorism warranted military responses based on military authorities,” 9/11 was the true 
point at which the criminal and military models converged). 
213  See Danner, supra note 27, at 8 (“[M]ost assumed the law of war simply did not apply to terror-
ist activities.  The United Kingdom, for example, stated when ratifying Additional Protocol I that ‘it is 
the understanding of the United Kingdom that the term “armed conflict” of itself and in its context de-
notes a situation of a kind which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes including acts 
of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation.’” (quoting Letter from Christopher Hulse, HM Ambassa-
dor of the U.K., to the Swiss Gov’t (Jan. 28, 1998), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2?OpenDocument)). 
214  Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 212, at 1084 (“The laws of war traditionally emphasize pure 
associational status as the primary ground for detention; individual conduct provides only a secondary, 
alternative predicate.”). 
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nees,215 detainees began challenging the constitutional adequacy and proce-
dures of the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) set up by the 
Bush Administration.  In one such case, In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 
Judge Green sharply criticized the CSRTs.216  Judge Green held that detai-
nees were entitled to assert due process rights and, therefore, the CSRTs 
were subject to review concerning their constitutionality under the Hamdi 
model.217  In her opinion, Judge Green also questioned the aspects of the 
CSRT enemy combatant definition218 that were associational (an element of 
the discourse of war but not crime),219 granting that the detainees had a via-
ble argument that this definition “violates long standing principles of due 
process by permitting the detention of individuals based solely on their 
membership in anti-American organizations rather than on actual activities 
supporting the use of violence or harm against the United States.”220 
This same type of exclusion can be seen in the scholarly and political 
debate over whether this conflict is an international conflict or a noninterna-
tional conflict.  Even though the United States overthrew the reigning gov-
ernment of a sovereign nation (Afghanistan) as part of an attack on a 
“single enemy, terrorism,” parts of the subsequent conflict have been held 
not to be an international conflict, but a noninternational conflict, a category 
originally conceptualized in reference to civil war and insurrection.221  Like 
 
215  542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004) (“These two cases present the narrow but important question whether 
United States courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign 
nationals captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval 
Base, Cuba.”); id. at 485 (“What is presently at stake is only whether the federal courts have jurisdiction 
to determine the legality of the Executive’s potentially indefinite detention of individuals who claim to 
be wholly innocent of wrongdoing.  [We] [a]nswer[] that question in the affirmative . . . .”). 
216  355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 450–52, 467–81 (D.D.C. 2005). 
217  See id. at 465; see also Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 212, at 1113 (explaining Judge 
Green’s decision). 
218  Judge Green noted that the Order creating the CSRTs appeared to be the first official definition 
of “enemy combatant.”  In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 450.  The Order stated: 
“[T]he term ‘enemy combatant’ shall mean an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al 
Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition 
partners.  This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostili-
ties in aid of enemy armed forces.”  Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec’y of Def., to Sec’y 
of the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal 1 (July 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf. 
219  See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d. at 475–76. 
220  Id. at 475. 
221  The Supreme Court did not find it necessary to answer the question of whether the war against al 
Qaeda should be classified as an international armed conflict because it found that Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Convention provided the necessary information and applied to “conflict[s] not of an interna-
tional character”; thus, it applied to the war on terrorism.  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629–
30 (2006).  The D.C. Circuit court had held previously that Common Article 2 did not apply because the 
conflict was not an international armed conflict between High Contracting Parties.  Hamdan v. Rums-
feld, 415 F.3d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  The D.C. Circuit had also held that 
Common Article 3 did not apply because the conflict was not a noninternational conflict (a “conflict not 
of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties”) because 
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the construct of unlawful enemy combatant, noninternational armed conflict 
has a historical basis and a complex set of relations that belong to a differ-
ent discourse than the one surrounding 9/11.  By asserting that the conflict 
was noninternational, the Supreme Court necessarily excluded the volumin-
ous discourse concerning international armed conflict and the treatment of 
civilians, prisoners, and combatants.  Whether that entire discourse is rele-
vant or not is debatable, but the Court should at least address the fact that 
the unique GWOT may not fit neatly into historical categories.  The Court 
should excavate the preexisting discursive relationships and exclusions that 
these imperfect analogies import into the current controversies and deter-
mine transparently whether such relationships and exclusions are appropri-
ate. 
B. The Discursive Formation as the Allocation of Power and Authority 
This Note’s argument is not that harnessing aspects of imperfect anal-
ogies is not proper.  Instead, it seeks to point out that the discursive forma-
tion, which is composed of énoncés and all of the referential space 
embedded in them, constructs the ways in which these analogies may be in-
terpreted and determines who has the authority to make such interpreta-
tions.  Within the post-9/11 discourse, as exemplified in the post-
Boumediene habeas litigation in the D.C. district courts, judges have occu-
pied a constrained role, asking whether instead of undertaking the obliga-
tion to answer why that Judge Wilkinson perceived.  A limited role for the 
judiciary may be the proper approach in this new kind of war, but courts 
have not excavated the discourse and made this argument.  They have in-
stead relied on unexamined énoncés and historical analogies. 
The exclusions and collateral, correlative, and complementary spaces 
of the énoncés of the post-9/11 discursive formation have constructed insti-
tutional power relationships, instead of the other way around.  Judge Leon’s 
resistance to the temptation of the “judicial craftsmanship” “exhibited” by 
the Fourth Circuit in al-Marri and his statement that the province of the ju-
diciary does not allow it to draft definitions222 is appealing at first because it 
seems to posit the proper role of the judiciary as the interpreter, but not the 
drafter, of law.  His statement also appears on its face to echo the tradition 
of deference to the Executive Branch in matters of foreign policy and dur-
ing wartime.223  Probably for these reasons, this apparently innocuous, un-
 
the conflict was international in scope.  Id. (“Common Article 3 applies only to armed conflicts confined 
to ‘a single country.’” (quoting INT’L COMM. RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA CONVENTION 
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 37 (1960))). 
222  See supra Part II.B. 
223  See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE 
L.J. 1170 (2007) (detailing the history of judicial deference to the Executive in matters of foreign rela-
tions and arguing that, in some circumstances, the judiciary should treat executive interpretations of sta-
tutes with the same deference with which it examines administrative interpretations under Chevron). 
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controversial statement has been explicitly asserted or implicitly accepted 
as the basis for almost all decisions in the habeas litigation within the D.C. 
Circuit following Boumediene.224 
For example, the Constitution explicitly bestows upon Congress the 
power to “define and punish . . . Offences against the law of nations,”225 but 
in a discursive formation that has excluded single offenses or acts from its 
purview in its focus on association and war, the detention (not punishment) 
of detainees (not prisoners) does not implicate this doctrine.  Although the 
definition of “unlawful enemy combatants” and thus the legal standard for 
detention proposed by the Executive Branch borrowed explicitly from a sta-
tute making it a crime to materially support terrorism,226 the discursive for-
mation does not allow both the criminal and military to coexist; it excludes 
the idea of “crime” in the unity of “war.”  Courts could argue that the 
AUMF is a proper delegation of power even if they accepted that the defini-
tion of an enemy combatant is essentially the definition of someone who 
commits the crime of terrorism, but they have not conducted such an exca-
vation of the unlawful enemy combatant énoncé. 
Informed by Foucault’s methodology, this Note argues that Judge Leon 
and many other members of the judiciary are speaking from a role con-
structed by the discursive formation itself.  The text of the discursive forma-
tion determines the meanings of and inherent relationships among terms 
such as “war” or “enemy combatant” and, consequently, the role of the ju-
diciary in analyzing questions involving those terms.  As Foucault explains, 
“Such discourses as economics, medicine, grammar, the science of living 
beings give rise to certain organizations of concepts, certain regroupings of 
objects, certain types of enunciation, which form, according to their degree 
of coherence, rigour, and stability, themes or theories . . . .”227  The themes 
and theories of the post-9/11 discursive formation, then, define where the 
power and authority of speech lie and what categories of speech are even 
possible. 
Foucault’s insights demonstrate that “[p]ower develops through ‘nor-
malization’, through defining what is usual and habitual and to be expected, 
as opposed to the deviant and exceptional.”228  The discursive formation that 
has developed after 9/11 postulates the attacks of that day as the origin, as a 
break with all previous discourses and the cause of all that has followed, but 
it also includes numerous historical unities that distribute power relation-
ships according to their normative content.  The GWOT is a new kind of 
war, calling for new kinds of warfare, but it still includes within it the his-
torical unity of “war.”  “Unlawful enemy combatants” are a new type of 
 
224  See supra Part II.B–C. 
225  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
226  See Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 212, at 1122–26. 
227  FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 64. 
228  WETHERELL & POTTER, supra note 202, at 84. 
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enemy that require new measures, but this label has existed since Quirin 
and continues to contain its relationships to its historical antecedent and its 
referential space.  In this way, the discursive formation has employed his-
torical discourses, each with a complex referential space that “is defined by 
the rules of formation and transformation of the mobile and multiple objects 
that those discourses construct and posit as their referents.”229  Therefore, 
instead of focusing on the radical discontinuity of the emergence of post-
9/11 unlawful enemy combatants, courts have felt bound by the historical 
rules of the label’s formation and definition.  Similarly, since 9/11 is seen as 
reconstituting all discourses, “terrorism,” which was previously located in 
the criminal discourse and accompanied by rules excluding it from the dis-
course of war,230 has now been reconceptualized and incorporated into an 
entirely different discursive formation.  These discursive interrelationships 
have gone unexplored and unaccounted for in judicial opinions.  Thus, the 
problem that this Note finds with the approach of many courts considering 
habeas petitions after Boumediene is the same problem confronted by Fou-
cault, and this Note calls for the same solution: archaeology. 
IV. AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE POST-9/11 DISCURSIVE FORMATION 
Judges should engage in archaeological methodology when deciding 
fundamental questions about the separation of powers and the applicability 
of old precedents to this “difficult time.”  The archaeology described below 
is necessary because énoncés are not immediately perceptible but are typi-
cally hidden among the phrases and propositions of a discourse.  Therefore, 
the courts rely on these self-legitimizing foundational terms and concepts 
without actually exploring whether they are, in fact, new emergences within 
the post-9/11 discursive formation.  The plinth, the base supporting a statute 
or column, must be unearthed and “polished—even fashioned or in-
vented.”231  One of the principal reasons Foucault advocates this archaeolo-
gy is his desire to focus on the radical discontinuity of emergences instead 
of situating them within a larger historical narrative.  At the same time, 
Foucault seeks to eliminate the idea that “historical development . . . is or-
ganized like a necessary continuity; that events are linked together, the one 
engendering the other in an uninterrupted flow that permits decreeing one 
the ‘cause’ or ‘origin’ of the other.”232 
In law, then, Foucault’s insight and proposed methodology are extraor-
dinarily valuable because they force a judge to wrestle with the way that 
words and concepts shift depending on their discursive relations.  Not only 
is this archaeological excavation of discourse a valuable practice in and of 
 
229  CHARTIER, supra note 59, at 57. 
230  See supra text accompanying notes 212–14. 
231  DELEUZE, supra note 10, at 16. 
232  CHARTIER, supra note 59, at 54. 
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itself, but it also provides the full blueprint of the structure of argumentation 
so that another judge who disagrees can respond on a more fundamental 
level.  For example, in the Fourth Amendment context, the Supreme Court 
relied on the historical ability of police officers to make warrantless arrests 
of individuals who commit felonies to uphold the constitutionality of an ar-
rest in United States v. Watson.233  In dissent, Justice Marshall pointed out 
that “felony” as the majority used it included a much wider swath of crimes 
than it had historically, and he argued that the majority opinion had thus 
failed to be faithful to historical practice.234  He was asserting that although 
the syntagm of “felony” remained the same, the énoncé of “felony” consti-
tuted something far different in the current discourse than it had historical-
ly.  Had the majority recognized this discursive point as well, it would have 
been forced to present an archaeological argument that “felony” as used to-
day should be treated in the same way that “felony” has been treated histor-
ically.  In the same way, the post-9/11 habeas cases present judges with the 
opportunity to engage in such an archaeological excavation with the post-
9/11 énoncés.  In so doing, the courts would provide a principled frame-
work, built upon the plinths underlying the discourse, with which others 
could disagree on the same fundamental level. 
In the cases outlined above, some courts have approached the historical 
development since 9/11 as a necessary continuum, each development built 
upon a prior event and existing within a self-enclosed discourse.  Many of 
the opinions start with 9/11 as both the origin and ultimate cause of each 
subsequent event.  “On September 11, 2001,” the world changed unaltera-
bly and nothing can be viewed except in its relation to 9/11.  Foucault’s dis-
cussion of the place of the French Revolution within the discourse of the 
Enlightenment could easily be mistaken for one about 9/11: 
 The idea of a single break suddenly, at a given moment, dividing all discur-
sive formations, interrupting them in a single moment and reconstituting them 
in accordance with the same rules—such an idea cannot be sustained.  
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he French Revolution . . . does not play the role of an event exterior 
to discourse, whose divisive effect one is under some kind of obligation to dis-
cover in all discourses; it functions as a complex, articulated, describable 
group of transformations that left a number of positivities intact, fixed for a 
 
233  423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976) (“The cases construing the Fourth Amendment thus reflect the ancient 
common-law rule that a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or 
felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence if there was rea-
sonable ground for making the arrest.”). 
234  Id. at 441–42 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he only clear lesson of history is contrary to the one 
the Court draws: the common law considered the arrest warrant far more important than today’s decision 
leaves it.”). 
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number of others rules that are still with us, and also established positivities 
that have recently disappeared or are still disappearing before our eyes.235 
The tragedy of 9/11 has created a “sudden break” in all discourses, a fact 
recognized by many judges in the judicial discourse.  However, the event is 
not “exterior” to the preexisting discourses so that it has had no influence 
over their underlying meaning.  The discursive formation that has resulted 
presumes that many previously existing legal constructs have been “left in-
tact” without addressing the question of why.  As Foucault says of the 
French Revolution, the proposition that 9/11 occurred and interrupted eve-
rything only to put everything back in “accordance with the same rules” 
cannot be sustained.  In ushering in this “difficult time,” 9/11 has also es-
tablished a new discursive formation, with new rules, new énoncés, and a 
new référentiel consisting of its own collateral, correlative, and comple-
mentary spaces. 
However, the plinths of the post-9/11 judicial discourse—such terms as 
“national security,” “war,” and “enemy combatants”—are being used regu-
larly by judges who either do not see the interrelationships within the dis-
cursive formation that have reconstructed their meaning or feel powerless to 
address them.  Instead of acknowledging the radical discontinuity between 
the historic use of these terms and their use within the post-9/11 discursive 
formation, or even recognizing the possibility of such a discontinuity, most 
judges have relied on their unity. 
Judges can only understand the construction of the definitions and 
power relationships and determine who has the authority to “speak,” i.e. to 
draft definitions, by unearthing these énoncés and exploring their relational 
spaces.  Thus, judges must attempt to excavate the plinths of this post-9/11 
discursive formation.  An understanding of this discursive construction is 
necessary to form new principles, or plinths, upon which to base a decision 
about fundamental questions of the separation of powers and international 
law in the post-9/11 world.  Therefore, judges should excavate the discur-
sive formation and then, by means of what Foucault termed “controlled de-
cisions,” address the why of the foundational elements and institutional 
relationships of the discursive formation. 
A. Drafting the Definitions by a Series of “Controlled Decisions” 
Archaeology studies “human history . . . through the excavation of 
sites and the analysis of artifacts and other physical remains”236 and con-
structs a picture of past culture from these basic remnants.  Foucault chose 
this analogy to describe his discursive methodology and defined his version 
of archaeology: 
 
235  FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 175, 177. 
236  NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 82 (defining “archaeology”). 
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What, in short, we wish to do is to dispense with ‘things’.  To ‘depresentify’ 
them. . . .  To substitute for the enigmatic treasure of ‘things’ anterior to dis-
course, the regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse.  To de-
fine these objects without reference to the ground, the foundation of things, but 
by relating them to the body of rules that enable them to form as objects of a 
discourse and thus constitute the conditions of their historical appearance.237 
Thus, to escape the inertia of the post-9/11 discursive formation, the judi-
ciary must define its role and the constitutional principles that define it 
without reference to the “foundation,” i.e. self-legitimizing énoncés such as 
“war” and “foreign relations.”  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice O’Connor 
cited Youngstown and Egan for the proposition that the Judicial Branch has 
historically deferred to the Executive in matters of national security and 
foreign relations,238 but she did not relate these assertions to the “conditions 
of their historical appearance” as Foucauldian archaeology would require.  
Thus, she did not answer the question of whether her use of the phrases “na-
tional security” and “foreign relations” were the same énoncés as the iden-
tical phrases in those Korean War-era cases. 
The phrase “foreign relations,” when related to judicial deference, has 
traditionally referred to the relations of our singular government to the gov-
ernment of other countries or to different international bodies.239  Within the 
present discourse, however, the same syntagm is being used to refer to a 
nebulous idea of presidential power that is defined and constructed in part 
by the collateral space of the post-9/11 discourse.  In other words, courts are 
currently using “foreign relations” to describe particular events, such as a 
war against an undefined group of multinational terrorists, that would not 
be encompassed by its pre-9/11 énoncé.  As Judge Wilkinson realized, it is 
not self-evident that the constitutional considerations and policy justifica-
tions used to rationalize deference to the Executive in those past circums-
tances also justify the present deference when the Executive acts directly on 
foreign individuals; the unity must be established by a principled, rigorous, 
archaeological investigation. 
Foucault opens The Archaeology of Knowledge by advocating for the 
suspension of all unities, all “pre-existing forms of continuity,” and de-
mands that these “syntheses that are accepted without question” be reex-
amined.240  He urges that “the tranquility with which they are accepted must 
be disturbed; we must show that they do not come about of themselves, but 
 
237  FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 47–48. 
238  See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
239  See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 223, at 1202 (“Deference to the executive in foreign re-
lations cases is traditionally based on both constitutional and functional considerations. . . .  Courts say 
that the nation must speak in ‘one voice’ in its foreign policy; the executive can do this, while Congress 
and the courts cannot.”); id. at 1205 (“Litigation produces entanglement problems when the decision on 
the merits is likely to offend a foreign sovereign, perhaps leading it to withdraw cooperation in some 
area of foreign relations . . . .”). 
240  FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 25. 
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are always the result of a construction.”241  In the legal sphere, Foucault’s 
methodology is vital because, by undertaking to show the “construction” of 
these purported syntheses, a judge makes transparent the fundamental prin-
ciples on which her decision rests.  Creating more transparent judicial deci-
sions within the post-9/11 discourse will, in turn, create the opportunity for 
disagreement and debate concerning the excavation and the foundational 
plinths relied upon by each judge.  This kind of dynamic, principled debate, 
with no inherent assumptions or relationships, seems to be what the Su-
preme Court contemplated when it said, “The legal category of enemy 
combatant has not been elaborated upon in great detail.  The permissible 
bounds of the category will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent 
cases are presented to them.”242 
Foucault’s insight demonstrates that a thorough, archaeological inves-
tigation of the post-9/11 discourse, like that of any discourse or discipline, 
cannot be undertaken without scrutinizing the justifications for the parallels 
and analogies it contains.  To scrutinize the presupposed unity of terms, we 
must endeavor “to tear away from them their virtual self-evidence . . . ; to  
recognize that they are not the tranquil locus on the basis of which other 
questions . . . may be posed, but that they themselves pose a whole cluster 
of questions.”243  The judiciary, then, must tear all of the self-legitimizing 
unities of post-9/11 discourse—national security, war, foreign relations, 
enemy combatants, etc.—away from their “virtual self-evidence.”  In the 
post-Boumediene habeas litigation, most courts have been using these terms 
as the tranquil locus of their reasoning, but they have not recognized that 
these discursive constructs pose numerous questions in and of themselves.  
Most significantly, are they the same énoncés used in historical judicial dis-
course such that their invocation in the post-9/11 context should bring about 
the same legal outcome? 
After this suspension of seemingly self-evident syntheses, a judge will 
be able to excavate the post-9/11 discursive formation and construct a new 
edifice with its plinths and fundamental construction transparent to all.  Ac-
cording to Foucault, this archaeological endeavor occurs in three stages.  
First, “the systematic erasure of all given unities enables us  . . . to restore to 
the statement the specificity of its occurrence.”244  Foucault wants to ex-
amine the “event,” “[h]owever banal,” of a concept entering a discourse, 
which is linked not only to its causes and consequences, but also to the 
“[énoncés] that precede and follow it.”245  Foucault says, “[W]e must grasp 
the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; determine its condi-
tions of existence, fix at least its limits, establish its correlations with other 
 
241  Id. 
242  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 522 n.1 (2004). 
243  FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 26. 
244  Id. at 28. 
245  Id. 
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statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of 
statement it excludes.”246  Second, the initial suspension of self-evident un-
ities allows one to “leave oneself free to describe the interplay of relations” 
both within and outside the discursive formation.247  Finally, Foucault ar-
gues that this suspension, “by freeing [a description of the facts of dis-
course] of all the groupings that purport to be natural, immediate, universal 
unities,” allows an individual to describe new unities “but this time by 
means of a group of controlled decisions.”248 
In the post-Boumediene habeas litigation, then, suspending the histori-
cal unity of these énoncés will allow judges to first excavate the discursive 
formation and the inherent relations and exclusions within the post-9/11 
discourse.  By confronting the imperfections of historical analogy, the dif-
ferent discursive relationships, and the exclusions the complementary space 
entails, judges will be free to describe these relationships, both inside and 
outside of the post-9/11 discourse.  In other words, they will be forced to 
enumerate what the differences are in this post-9/11 era and be free to de-
scribe how the historical ideas and post-9/11 discourse relate to one anoth-
er.  Most importantly, undertaking this excavation will then allow each 
judge to make controlled, principled decisions about the implications of 
these differences and to construct a framework that other judges can criti-
que and refine.  This kind of archaeological excavation will not only give 
notice to the current and future members of the political branches about the 
principles that should govern this new kind of war but will also create a dy-
namic, constructive dialogue between judges themselves.  Because this pro-
posal is somewhat abstract, the following section offers the Boumediene 
opinions of Justices Kennedy and Scalia as an example of the contrast be-
tween the archaeological excavation for which this Note argues and the re-
liance on self-legitimizing énoncés that has characterized the habeas 
litigation to this point.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion undertakes the three 
phases of excavation and construction outlined above and represents a su-
perb model of Foucauldian archaeology, but Justice Scalia’s opinion em-
phasizes the “difficult time” of the post-9/11 era and relies on unexamined 
énoncés to support his arguments. 
B. Justice Kennedy’s Boumediene Opinion as an Archaeological Endeavor 
Discussing the applicability of the “great writ” of habeas corpus in his 
majority opinion in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy offered an example of 
Foucauldian archaeology.  His opinion opened with the specific factual sce-
nario of the case: “Petitioners are aliens designated as enemy combatants 
and detained at [Guantánamo].”249  His background section explained the 
 
246  Id. 
247  Id. at 29. 
248  Id. 
249  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008). 
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specific legal context instead of beginning with the 9/11 attacks: “Under the 
[AUMF], the President is authorized ‘to use all necessary and appropriate 
force . . . .’”250  Justice Kennedy then began his excavation, offering an ex-
haustive analysis of the historical role of habeas corpus under English 
common law and U.S. practice.251  In examining the extraterritorial reach of 
habeas, Justice Kennedy did not assume that “sovereignty” in the historical 
discourse and “sovereignty” in the post-9/11 discourses were the same 
énoncé252 but suspended all presupposed syntheses and unearthed all of the 
fundamental plinths of the historical place of habeas proceedings. 
This fulfilled Foucault’s first goal of recognizing the emergence of an 
énoncé and the historical context surrounding it.  Indeed, Justice Kennedy 
recognized new emergences—“the unique status of Guantanamo Bay and 
the particular dangers of terrorism in the modern age”—and accepted that 
“common-law courts simply may not have confronted cases with close par-
allels to this one.”253  Toward the close of his opinion, Justice Kennedy 
noted that “[o]fficials charged with daily operational responsibility for our 
security may consider a judicial discourse on the history of the Habeas Cor-
pus Act of 1679 and like matters to be far removed from the Nation’s 
present, urgent concerns.”254  He clearly recognized not only the novelty of 
the situation but also the fact that such novelty meant terms such as “sove-
reignty” were situated in a new discursive formation and needed to be uti-
lized. 
The opening of Justice Scalia’s dissent, however, sounded in stark con-
trast to the legal doctrine that began Justice Kennedy’s opinion as well as to 
the usual methodology of Justice Scalia’s opinions.255  He opened his dis-
cussion by abruptly announcing, “America is at war with radical Islamists” 
and then proceeded to detail the number of deaths caused by each of a series 
of terrorist attacks.256   He reached a crescendo with, “On September 11, 
2001, the enemy brought the battle to American soil, killing 2,749 at the 
Twin Towers in New York City, 184 at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., 
and 40 in Pennsylvania.”257  This statement, no less than Hamdi’s “difficult 
time,” immediately situated the discussion that followed within a particular 
discourse, alerting the reader that the considerations that followed were in-
separable from the discourse of 9/11 and based on more than legal prin-
ciples.  In these opening paragraphs, Justice Scalia continued his vivid 
 
250  Id. at 733 (citation omitted). 
251  See id. at 739–71. 
252  See, e.g., id. at 748–55. 
253  Id. at 752. 
254  Id. at 797 (emphasis added). 
255  Id. at 827 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Contrary to my usual practice, however, I think it appropriate 
to begin with a description of the disastrous consequences of what the Court has done today.”). 
256  Id. 
257  Id. 
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description of the “difficult time,” claiming that “one need only walk about 
buttressed and barricaded Washington, or board a plane anywhere in the 
country, to know that the threat is a serious one.”258  Adopting a somewhat 
fatalistic tone, he stridently criticized the Court’s decision on an extralegal 
basis by predicting that the “devastating” decision would “almost certainly 
cause more Americans to be killed.”259  Touching on enemy combatants, 
war, and national security in one sentence, Justice Scalia argued that the 
“blunders” of the majority opinion “make[] unnervingly clear [that] how to 
handle enemy prisoners in this war will ultimately lie with the branch that 
knows least about the national security concerns that the subject entails.”260 
Justice Kennedy agreed that proper deference should be accorded to 
the political branches in the realm of foreign affairs, citing United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,261 a classic case that immediately conjures the 
principle of inherent foreign relations power.262  However, these statements 
came only after he conducted the archaeological investigation of the discur-
sive formation for which this Note advocates; he conducted an excavation 
to determine how the fundamental constitutional and policy judgments the 
historical principles contain related to the specific scenario confronting the 
Court. 
For example, Justice Kennedy’s discussion of sovereignty clearly con-
trasts with the automatic deference based on the unexplored idea of “na-
tional security” in Justice Scalia’s opinion.  His excavation of “sovereignty” 
demonstrates an innate understanding of Foucault’s insights about the need 
for investigation and archaeology.  Justice Kennedy began with the recogni-
tion that the “Court has held that questions of sovereignty are for the politi-
cal branches to decide,”263 but then unearthed the plinth on which this 
deference was traditionally based.  Recognizing that “‘[s]overeignty’ is a 
term used in many senses and is much abused,”264 he proceeded to note that 
the historical deference was based on a reference to “sovereignty in the nar-
row, legal sense of the term”265 and not a reference to the “general, collo-
quial sense, meaning the exercise of dominion or power.”266  By suspending 
the unity of past issues of war, national security, and sovereignty on which 
Justice Scalia relied in his dissent, Justice Kennedy left himself free to de-
 
258  Id. 
259  Id. at 828. 
260  Id. at 831. 
261  299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
262  See id. at 319 (“In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and mani-
fold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”). 
263  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 753. 
264  Id. at 754 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206 cmt. b (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
265  Id. (citing 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, su-
pra note 264, § 206 cmt. b). 
266  Id. (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2406 (2d ed. 1934)). 
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scribe the “interplay of the relations”267 inside and outside of the discursive 
formation. 
After excavating the roots of the discourse about habeas and describing 
the historical, institutional, and social relationships that he found important, 
Justice Kennedy could then construct a new framework based on controlled, 
principled decisions.  For example, Justice Scalia relied heavily on Johnson 
v. Eisentrager,268 a World War II case that held that the Court did not have 
jurisdiction to hear the habeas petitions of German citizens who were held 
on a U.S. base in Germany and who sought to challenge their conviction of 
war crimes by a military commission.269  In Justice Kennedy’s discussion of 
the case, though, he noted that the “historical context and nature of the mili-
tary’s mission” was “far different” in that case.270  By suspending all of 
these unities, Justice Kennedy freed himself from the “natural, immediate” 
unities that Foucault describes and was able to construct new unities by a 
series of “controlled decisions.”  Justice Kennedy excavated the collateral, 
correlative, and complementary spaces that are present within the énoncés 
and the enunciative field of the post-9/11 discourse.  He recognized the rad-
ical discontinuity of the historical and modern definitions of “sovereignty” 
despite the self-legitimizing unity of the term. 
By contrast, Justice Scalia’s dissent emphasized that Justice Kennedy 
had failed to distinguish Eisentrager and had thus overruled its holding 
without explicitly saying so.  Although his point may be correct as a formal 
matter, it can only be so if one accepts the self-legitimizing unities of the 
discourse, e.g., the historical unity of World War II and the GWOT and the 
unity of the idea of sovereignty in the two cases.  Whether or not one agrees 
with Justice Kennedy’s conclusion that these unities do not exist, he at least 
addressed the issue on the fundamental discursive level of the énoncé and 
offered an argument that can be disputed by others, such as Justice Scalia or 
the political branches.271 
Justice Kennedy approached the issue of the extraterritorial application 
of habeas using the same archaeological method with which Judge Wilkin-
 
267  See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
268  339 U.S. 763 (1950); see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 834–42 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
269  See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 765–66, 768. 
270  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769 (majority opinion).  
271  Shortly after the opinion came down, one commentator remarked that “[i]n one sense the dissen-
ters’ rhetoric is fairly standard stuff, albeit unbecomingly vitriolic.  But there’s an issue here that goes 
beyond mere rhetoric: I think in this case the dissenters may actually misunderstand the majority’s con-
ception of how deference ought to work.”  Julian Davis Mortenson, Deference Reconsidered, OPINIO 
JURIS (June 17, 2008, 11:40 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2008/06/17/deference-reconsidered.  Mortenson 
recognized that Justice Kennedy was not forsaking deference altogether in “insist[ing] on setting the es-
sential terms of review itself,” but just defining the type of deference that would be appropriate in this 
new discursive context.  See id. (“[I]t seems clear to me from the tone and approach of the Boumediene 
majority that a serious and systematic effort [by the political branches] to lay down rules . . . governing 
preventive detention is likely to be respected by this Court.”). 
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son approached the detention issue in al-Marri.  Both judges refused to let 
the origin and radical discontinuity of 9/11 obscure the fact that other radi-
cal new emergences may be occurring within the discourse as well.  After 
excavating the discourse, both chose to construct new edifices that transpa-
rently rested on the plinths they had unearthed.  As Judge Wilkinson recog-
nized, this thorough excavation, recognition of new emergences, and 
reconstruction of foundational principles constitute the obligations of the 
judicial branch. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note contends that judges in the Guantánamo habeas cases, and in 
future cases presenting “hard questions,” must engage the issues directly, 
on a fundamental discursive level.  One of the principal purposes of the 
Judicial Branch is to control the excesses of the Executive and Legislative 
Branches in order to protect individual liberties, especially during wartime.  
The ancient writ of habeas corpus is one of the most salient examples of 
this role.272  In recent habeas proceedings, however, the courts have spoken 
from within the post-9/11 discursive formation and based their decisions on 
foundational énoncés that necessarily preclude this power.  Taking all “ne-
cessary and appropriate” measures in a discursively unified conception of 
“war” may historically have included a fundamental power to detain com-
batants, but the inquiry should not end there.  The judiciary may have a his-
torical practice of deferring to the Executive in matters of “national 
security” and “foreign affairs,” but that should not be the final word.  Only 
by exploring these self-legitimizing terms that carry so many inherent rela-
tionships to history, institutional practice, and the current discourse can a 
judge both provide notice to the political branches and engage in the kind of 
dynamic, constructive dialogue that will hone and test the issues confront-
ing the judiciary today. 
Professor Daniel Williams observed that it seems “as if the ontology of 
‘enemy combatants’ was foisted upon us by 9/11.”273  He uses figurative 
language to describe the way that the discourse obscures the fact that 
“‘enemy combatant’ is a construct we have injected into our cultural mi-
lieu.”274  This description of the way it seems is actually a description of re-
ality.  There is no subject, no “we,” that created this “construct.”  Instead, 
the post-9/11 discursive formation has “foisted” upon the governmental 
branches certain power relations and defined who has the authority to speak 
under specific circumstances.  As such, the discourse has constructed the 
 
272  See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739–45 (offering a detailed history of the Suspension Clause and 
concluding that “[i]t ensures that, except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a 
time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the ‘delicate balance of governance’ that is itself the surest safe-
guard of liberty” (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004))). 
273  Williams, supra note 15, at 387. 
274  Id. 
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term “enemy combatants” by excluding other discourses and delineating 
which actors have the authority to define it.  The text of this discursive for-
mation incorporates legal constructs—such as national security, noninterna-
tional conflict, unlawful enemy combatants, war, crime, and terrorism—that 
all have significant collateral, correlative, and complementary spaces.  Col-
lectively, these énoncés construct the enunciative field from which the post-
9/11 discursive formation arises. 
Judges hearing these habeas cases must tear the presupposed unity of 
concepts like “war,” “national security,” and “enemy combatants” away 
from their virtual self-evidence and excavate the discourse to examine and 
wrestle with the “material remains,” the basic atoms (énoncés), of the dis-
cursive formation at their fundamental level.  They should follow the ex-
ample of Justice Kennedy in Boumediene, as well as that of Judge 
Wilkinson in al-Marri.  They must dissect the collateral space by exploring 
the relationships among the various concepts within this discursive forma-
tion, unearth the correlative space by examining historical relationships and 
unities in light of the radical discontinuity of 9/11, and expose the comple-
mentary space by explicitly discussing the institutional milieu and its distri-
bution of power.  Then, and only then, can judges, by a series of “controlled 
decisions” draft a definition of “enemy combatants” and define the consti-
tutional and statutory principles that should govern this new kind of war.  
Whatever principles of deference and detention this archaeology establish-
es—whether they grant broad power to the Executive or institute significant 
judicial review—will rest on plinths that have been firmly constructed out 
of the partial remnants of former edifices.  Although Judge Brown, among 
others, has called for a legislative solution to this problem,275 judges should 
“make no apologies”276 for attempting to construct principled answers.  This 
archaeological excavation is “emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department.”277 
 
275  See Al-Bihani I, 590 F.3d 866, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Brown, J., concurring) (“But the circums-
tances that frustrate the judicial process are the same ones that make this situation particularly ripe for 
Congress to intervene pursuant to its policy expertise, democratic legitimacy, and oath to uphold and 
defend the Constitution.  These cases present hard questions and hard choices, ones best faced directly.  
Judicial review, however, is just that: re-view, an indirect and necessarily backward looking process.  
And looking backward may not be enough in this new war.  The saying that generals always fight the 
last war is familiar, but familiarity does not dull the maxim’s sober warning.”). 
276  Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 296 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated as moot sub nom. 
al-Marri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2009) (mem.). 
277  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Noriega v. Pastrana, 130 S. Ct. 
1002, 1002–03 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“This duty [to say what the law 
is] is particularly compelling in cases that present an opportunity to decide [constitutional and statutory 
issues] . . . in time to guide courts and the political branches in resolving difficult questions concerning 
the proper ‘exercise of governmental power.’ . . .  It is incumbent upon us to provide what guidance we 
can . . . .  [O]ur opinion will help the political branches and the courts discharge their responsibilities 
over detainee cases, and will spare detainees and the Government years of unnecessary litigation.” 
(quoting Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 637 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part))). 
